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INTRODUCTION
The last 25 years have witnessed a revolutionary change
in the status of cannabis under American law. Before 1996,
state and federal law uniformly outlawed its distribution.1
By contrast, today 36 states allow marijuana to be sold for
its potential medical use and 15 (along with the District of
Columbia) also permit its recreational use.2 The federal
Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA), however, still bans
the sale of cannabis for any purpose.3 The debate over the
appropriate status of marijuana begun in the 1960s4 has only
1. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841; RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD
II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE
UNITED STATES (1999).
2. See, e.g., Wayne Hall & Michael Lynskey, Assessing the Public Health
Impacts of Legalizing Recreational Cannabis Use: The U.S. Experience, 19 WORLD
PSYCHIATRY 179, 179-80 (2020); Claire Hansen & Horus Alas, Where Is Marijuana
Legal? A Guide to Marijuana Legalization, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 13,
2020, 3:24 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/where-ismarijuana-legal-a-guide-to-marijuana-legalization; Marijuana: Effects, Medical
Uses,
and
Legalization,
DRUGS.COM,
https://www.drugs.com/illicit/
marijuana.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2020); State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/statemedical-marijuana-laws.aspx (Feb. 19, 2021).
3. The Controlled Substances Act was Title II of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242
(current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904). Title I addressed prevention and
treatment of narcotics addiction, and Title III dealt with the import and export
of controlled substances. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 n.19 (2005). A
“controlled substance” is “a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor,
included in Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this [subchapter],” except for
“distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco, as those terms are defined or
used in subtitle E of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). The
Controlled Substances Act incorporates the definition of a “drug” from the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).
4. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A
SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING (1972) [hereinafter MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF
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accelerated since then and won’t slow down anytime soon.5
A thorough debate is critical to informed policymaking.
Unfortunately, however, “cannabis policy has raced ahead of
cannabis science.”6 For example, much of the past discussion
about legalization took place at a time when marijuana was
far less potent than it is today.7 That development is an
MISUNDERSTANDING]; E.R. BLOOMQUIST, MARIJUANA (1968); MARIJUANA (Erich
Goode ed., 1969); LESTER GRINSPOON, MARIHUANA RECONSIDERED (2d ed. 1977);
JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA: THE NEW PROHIBITION (1970); HERBERT L. PACKER,
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 333 (1968) (“A clearer case of
misapplication of the criminal sanction would be difficult to imagine.”); JOHN
ROSEVEAR, POT: A HANDBOOK OF MARIHUANA (1967); MICHAEL SCHOFIELD, THE
STRANGE CASE OF POT (1971); THE MARIHUANA PAPERS (David Solomon ed., 1968)
[hereinafter THE MARIHUANA PAPERS]; Geoffrey Richard Wagner Smith,
Possession of Marijuana in San Mateo County: Some Social Costs of
Criminalization, 22 STAN. L. REV. 101, 103 (1969) (“In the same week that the
President of the United States declared an all-out war on marijuana smuggling,
. . . the Wall Street Journal reported discussion in the business world on the profit
potential in legalized marijuana.”).
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BENNETT & ROBERT A. WHITE, GOING TO POT: WHY THE
RUSH TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA IS HARMING AMERICA (2015); ROBERT A. MIKOS,
MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY (2017); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Marijuana
Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck,
GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS (Brookings Inst., Washington, D.C.), Apr.
2013, at 1; ROBIN ROOM ET AL., CANNABIS POLICY: BEYOND STALEMATE (2010);
CONTEMPORARY HEALTH ISSUES ON MARIJUANA (Kevin A. Sabet & Ken C. Winters
eds., 2018); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana
Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015); Brianne J. Gorod, Marijuana
Legalization and Horizontal Federalism, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 595 (2016); Todd
Grabarsky, Conflicting Federal and State Medical Marijuana Policies: A Threat
to Cooperative Federalism, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2013). For a summary of the
competing arguments, compare Tamar Todd, The Benefits of Marijuana
Legalization and Regulation, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 99 (2018) (summarizing
the pro-legalization case), with Kevin Sabet, Marijuana and Legalization
Impacts, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 84 (2018) (summarizing the anti-legalization
case).
6. Archie Bleyer & Brian Barnes, Comment & Response, Opioid Death Rate
Acceleration in Jurisdictions Legalizing Marijuana Use, 178 JAMA INTERNAL
MED. 1280, 1280 (2018).
7. From the 1960s through the 1980s, the THC content of agricultural
marijuana was approximately only 1-3 percent. Today, that number is far higher,
reaching 90-plus percent in some cases. See, e.g., KEVIN A. SABET, SMOKESCREEN:
WHAT THE MARIJUANA INDUSTRY DOESN’T WANT YOU TO KNOW 32 (2021); Suman
Chandra et al., New Trends in Cannabis Potency in USA and Europe During the
Last Decade (2008-2017), 269 EUR. ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRY CLINICAL
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important one. As Nora Volkow, Director of the National
Institute on Drug Abuse, has noted, “increase in THC
content raises concerns that the consequences of marijuana
use may be worse now than in the past . . . .”8 Beer and grain
alcohol do not have the same per-ounce “kick,” and the same
is true of granddaddy’s ganja and today’s weed. Just as no
one would base alcohol policy on the psychoactive effects of
only beer or wine to the exclusion of distilled spirits, so, too,
no one should ignore the current state of scientific knowledge
regarding contemporary marijuana. That is critical given the
potentially
life-shattering
effects
that
long-term
consumption of today’s cannabis can have on the labile
adolescent brain.9
Yet, scientific issues are not the only ones that need close
NEUROSCIENCES
5
(2019);
Wayne
Hall
&
Louisa
Degenhardt,
Editorial, High Potency Cannabis: A Risk Factor for Dependence, Poor
Psychosocial Outcomes, and Psychosis, 350 BMJ 1205 (2015); infra note 96. See
generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & Bertha K. Madras, Opioids, Overdoses, and
Cannabis: Is Marijuana an Effective Therapeutic Response to the Opioid Abuse
Epidemic?, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 573–74, 574 n.71 (2019) (collecting
authorities).
8. Nora D. Volkow et al., Adverse Health Effects of Marijuana Use, 370 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2219, 2222 (2014). That is why she has questioned “the current
relevance of the findings in older studies on the effects of marijuana use,
especially studies that assessed long-term outcomes.” Id.
9. See, e.g., GEORGE F. KOOB ET AL., DRUGS, ADDICTION, AND THE BRAIN 269,
279–87 (2014); Alan J. Budney et al., Cannabis, in LOWINSON AND RUIZ’S
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 227 (Pedro Ruiz & Eric Strain eds., 5th ed. 2011); ROOM ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 31–39 (describing studies investigating the risk that adolescent
marijuana use could adversely affect learning, result in a greater drop-out rate,
be a prelude to other drug use, or lead to schizophrenia or depression);
Volkow, supra note 8, at 2219 (“The regular use of marijuana during adolescence
is of particular concern, since use by this age group is associated with an
increased likelihood of deleterious consequences.”); id. at 2220 tbl.1.1 (noting that
altered brain development, poor educational outcome, cognitive impairment, and
diminished life satisfaction are “strongly associated with initial marijuana use
early in adolescence”). See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Marijuana Edibles and
“Gummy Bears,” 66 BUFF. L. REV. 313, 324–39, 326 nn.30-63 (2018) [hereinafter
Larkin, Gummy Bears] (collecting authorities). That is a reason why the
American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Cancer Society, the American
Academy of Ophthalmology, the National Institute for Drug Abuse, and others
have said that minors should not use cannabis. Id. at 327–28, 328 n.31.
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scrutiny in this regard.10 Numerous, novel economic,
business, and regulatory questions arise when a substance
transitions from contraband to a consumer good.11 Many of
10. Most of the discussion to date focuses on the practical difficulty (and
intellectual impossibility) of continuing to allow two entirely different and
inconsistent regulatory schemes to continue to butt heads over the identical
subject. There is a clear conflict between federal criminal law and the statutes in
more than 30 states, which grant people licenses to engage in conduct that federal
law makes a crime. No one believes that the current state of affairs is a good one,
but there is no consensus about which solution is optimal. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr.,
Reflexive Federalism, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter
Larkin, Reflexive Federalism]. The states cannot remedy this problem on their
own. The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution makes federal law
superior to state law when the two conflict. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). Accordingly, states cannot
exempt their residents from federal law by adopting their own regulatory
programs. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23–33 (2005) (rejecting the
argument that a state medical marijuana program available only for bona fide
state residents should be exempt from federal regulation under the Commerce
Clause); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494–95
(2001) (rejecting a medical necessity defense to federal prosecution in a state with
a medical marijuana program). Congress could revise the CSA to eliminate the
ban on cannabis trafficking in states that now permit it, but Congress has refused
to tackle that issue head on. Instead, Congress has only nibbled around the edges
of the issue. Since 2014, Congress has regularly passed appropriations bills
prohibiting the U.S. Department of Justice from halting state medical marijuana
programs. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering Federal Marijuana Regulation, 18
OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 99, 108, 108 n.39 (2020) [hereinafter Larkin, Reconsidering
Marijuana].
11. See, e.g., JEFF CHAPMAN ET AL., PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FORECASTS HAZY
BEN CORT, WEED, INC.: THE TRUTH ABOUT
THC, THE POT LOBBY, THC, AND THE COMMERCIAL MARIJUANA INDUSTRY (2017);
DANIELLE DAVENPORT, CANNABIS, INC.: THE JOURNEY FROM COMPASSION TO
INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION (2019); JOHN GELUARDI, CANNABIZ: THE EXPLOSIVE RISE
OF THE MEDICAL MARIJUANA INDUSTRY (2010); CHRISTIAN HAGESETH, BIG WEED:
AN ENTREPRENEUR’S HIGH STAKES ADVENTURES IN THE BUDDING LEGAL MARIJUANA
BUSINESS (2015); THE POT BOOK: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO CANNABIS (Julie Holland
ed., 2010); ROSS O’BRIEN, CANNABIS CAPITAL: HOW TO GET YOUR BUSINESS FUNDED
IN THE CANNABIS ECONOMY (2020); TRISH REGAN, JOINT VENTURES: INSIDE
AMERICA’S ALMOST LEGAL MARIJUANA INDUSTRY (2011); D.J. SUMMERS, THE
BUSINESS OF CANNABIS: NEW POLICIES FOR THE NEW MARIJUANA INDUSTRY (2018);
Sam Kamin, What California Can Learn from Colorado’s Marijuana Regulations,
49 U. PAC. L. REV. 13 (2017) [hereinafter Kamin, Colorado’s Marijuana
FOR STATE MARIJUANA REVENUE (2019);
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those issues were not extensively discussed before 1996
because they would have been entirely academic when
cannabis was outlawed everywhere and had to be grown,
sold, possessed, and used in secret. After all, it makes little
sense to spend much time deciding how to publicly regulate
the distribution of contraband. Given the revolution in state
law, however, marijuana no longer has that status in every
state. Cannabis has become an item of “quasi-legal”
commerce—quasi-legal because federal law remains
unchanged, and there is disunity across the states.12 The
result is a pressing need to consider whether and how to
regulate cannabis in states with medical or recreational
marijuana programs.
What enhances the urgency of the matter is the risk that
Congress might revise the CSA and allow the states to make
all regulatory decisions.13 In theory, of course, Congress’s
decision to allow the states to decide how to regulate an issue
would be seen as a victory for the principles of federalism. It
Regulations]; John Mixon, Commercializing Cannabis: Confronting the
Challenges and Uncertainty of Trademark and Trade Secret Protection for
Cannabis-Related Businesses, 16 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 1 (2020); Luke
Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s Challenge for Business Entity Law, 6
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511 (2015); Thomas Stufano, Through the Smoke: Do
Current Civil Liability Laws Address the Unique Issues Presented by the
Recreational Marijuana Industry?, 34 TOURO L. Rev. 1409 (2018); Ryan B. Stoa,
Marijuana Agricultural Law: Regulation at the Root of an Industry, 69 FLA. L.
REV. 297 (2017); Brandon Mikhail Thompson, The Incredible Edible: Protecting
Businesses and Consumers in a Society of Legalized Cannabis, 4 NEV. L. J. F. 60
(2020).
12. The rules governing medical and recreational programs vary from state
to state. See, e.g., THOMAS F. BABOR ET AL., DRUG POLICY AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
245-54 (2d ed. 2018); Rosalie L. Pacula et al., Words Can Be Deceiving: A Review
of Variation among Legally Effective Medical Marijuana Laws in the United
States, 7 J. DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 (2014).
13. Toward the end of the 116th Congress, the House of Representatives
passed the Marijuana Opportunity, Reinvestment, and Expungement (MORE)
Act of 2020, H.R. 3884, 116th Cong. (2d Sess. 2020), which would have lifted the
federal ban on distributing marijuana. The Senate did not act on the bill before
the end of that Congress. Someone likely will reintroduce it in the 117th
Congress. See also, e.g., Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through
Entrusting States Act, H.R. 2093, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019) (a bill that would
amend the CSA to allow the states to decide whether to legalize marijuana).
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would allow each of the 50 states to “serve as a laboratory”
and “try novel social and economic experiments” to develop
different regulatory approaches in an effort to decide which
one works best “without risk to the rest of the country.”14 The
reality of the matter, however, could be quite different. As
Carnegie-Mellon University Professor Jonathan Caulkins,
an expert on marijuana policy, has admonished us, legalizing
the for-profit sale of marijuana “is an irreversible leap into
the unknown” and “would be next to impossible to unwind.”15
Before the nation commits itself to a potentially irreversible
course, we should consider whether the current state
programs—which
permit
the
private,
large-scale,
commercial distribution of cannabis—represent the business
model that we want to endorse nationwide.16
That discussion must focus on two unique challenges
that cannabis poses, ones not raised by most other consumer
products. Those challenges stem from one of cannabis’

14. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See generally MARIJUANA FEDERALISM: UNCLE SAM AND MARY JANE
(Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2020) (collecting essays making that argument).
15. Jonathan Caulkins, Against a Weed Industry, NAT’L REV., Apr. 2, 2018, at
27 [hereinafter Caulkins, Weed Industry].
16. A few legal scholars have addressed those issues. See, e.g., DOUGLAS A.
BERMAN & ALEX KREIT, MARIJUANA LAW AND POLICY (2020); Richard J. Bonnie,
The Surprising Collapse of Marijuana Prohibition: What Now?, Keynote Address
at the UC Davis Law Review Symposium: Disjointed Regulation: State Efforts to
Legalize Marijuana (Jan. 29, 2016), in 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 573 (2016); Sam
Kamin, Legal Cannabis in the U.S.: Not Whether but How?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
617, 652 (2016) [hereinafter Kamin, Legal Cannabis]; Robert A. Mikos,
Marijuana Localism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 719 (2015). The best policy
analyses, however, are by non-lawyer cannabis experts, such as Jonathan
Caulkins, Beau Kilmer, the late Mark Kleiman, and Rosalie Ricardo Pacula. See,
e.g., Caulkins, Weed Industry, supra note 15; Jonathan P. Caulkins, A Principled
Approach to Taxing Marijuana, NAT’L AFFS., Summer 2017, at 22; Jonathan P.
Caulkins, The Real Dangers of Marijuana, NAT’L AFFS., Winter 2016, at 21
[hereinafter Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers]; Mark A.R. Kleiman, The PublicHealth Case for Legalizing Marijuana, NAT’L AFFS., Spring 2019, at 68
[hereinafter Kleiman, Marijuana and Public Health]; Mark A.R. Kleiman,
Cannabis, Conservatively, NAT’L REV., Dec. 8, 2014, at 28 [hereinafter Kleiman,
Cannabis Conservatively]. Their analyses, conclusions, and recommendations are
worth very serious consideration.
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biologically active constituents (known as cannabinoids)—
Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol or THC, the ingredient responsible
for marijuana’s well-known euphoric effect.17 THC puts
marijuana into a small category of consumer products, like
tobacco and alcohol, because regular use can render
individuals dependent on the drug. Moreover, like alcohol,
even occasional use of THC can impair someone’s ability to
safely operate a motor vehicle, which can lead to the grievous
injury or death of third parties. For both reasons, cannabis
use creates more misery than joy for some people.18 We
should not adopt a potentially irreversible course of full
commercialization
before
carefully
examining
the
consequences.
The discussion below proceeds as follows: Part I
discusses the evolution of cannabis from contraband to
regulated consumer product. It will summarize how
marijuana lost its status as kryptonite in contemporary
America and what the cannabis industry looks like today.
Part II will discuss state regulation of that industry. Part
II.A. will discuss how states use the regulatory process to
address traditional price and quality issues. Part II.B. will
then examine the two issues mentioned above that arise
because of the peculiar nature of marijuana: dependency and
impairment. To address those problems, that Part
recommends that states should own all retail stores where
cannabis is sold and should refuse to advertise any aspect of
its availability, price, and quality themselves. Those steps
would address the dependency and impairment problems by
making unlawful purchases far more difficult and legal
purchases of cannabis only slightly more difficult. Part III
then speaks to what Congress can do to help the states
address dependency and impairment. It argues that
Congress should require a state to adopt both regulatory

17. LESLIE L. IVERSEN, THE SCIENCE OF MARIJUANA 100–04 (2d ed. 2008).
18. See ED GOGEK, MARIJUANA DEBUNKED 140 (2015) (“The nature of all
addictive drugs is to promise bliss but deliver woe.”).
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tools as a condition of revising federal law to allow the
cultivation and distribution of marijuana in its jurisdiction.
Part III also discusses whether the Tenth Amendment
forbids Congress from putting the states to that choice.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF CANNABIS FROM CONTRABAND TO
CONSUMER PRODUCT

A. The Legal Evolution
The plant botanically classified as cannabis, but
popularly called marijuana, has existed since at least the
Neolithic Period, when humans began to learn agriculture,
more than ten thousand years ago.19 Cannabis contains
numerous biologically active compounds.20 The best-known
one is THC, which produces a euphoric effect.21 That effect,
coupled with the argument that the plant has several
potential medical benefits, has generated a large number of
19. Swedish botanist Karl Linnaeus labeled it as cannabis sativa in 1753. See,
e.g., BRIT. MED. ASS’N, THERAPEUTIC USES OF CANNABIS 7 (1997); BRIAN F. THOMAS
& MAHMOUD A. ELSOHLY, THE ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY OF CANNABIS 1 (2016);
Sunil K. Aggarwal et al., Medicinal Use of Cannabis in the United States:
Historical Perspectives, Current Trends, and Future Directions, 5 J. OPIOID MGMT.
153, 153–57 (2009).
20. Cannabis contains more than 100 known cannabinoids and, altogether,
more than 700 known constituents. There are three categories of cannabinoids.
Endocannabinoids are innate neurotransmitters produced in the brain or in
peripheral tissues. Phytocannabinoids are compounds produced by the plants
Cannabis sativa or Cannabis indica. Synthetic cannabinoids are laboratorysynthesized compounds that are structurally analogous or similar to
phytocannabinoids or endocannabinoids, and may act by similar or different
biological mechanisms. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., THE HEALTH
EFFECTS OF CANNABIS AND CANNABINOIDS: THE CURRENT STATE OF EVIDENCE AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH 54 tbl.2-2 (2017) [hereinafter NAT’L ACAD.
REPORT]; Seddon R. Savage et al., Cannabis in Pain Treatment: Clinical and
Research Considerations, 17 J. PAIN 654, 656 (2016).
21. See, e.g., Marijuana Research Report, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE
[hereinafter NAT’L INST., Marijuana], https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/
research-reports/marijuana/what-are-marijuana-effects (July 2020) (“Many
people experience a pleasant euphoria and sense of relaxation. Other common
effects, which may vary dramatically among different people, include heightened
sensory perception (e.g., brighter colors), laughter, altered perception of time, and
increased appetite.”).
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cannabis use advocates.22 At the same time, cannabis use can
have harmful effects on users and third parties.23 For
example, heavy or long-term cannabis users can become
dependent on the drug.24 THC also impairs one’s ability to
handle a motor vehicle safely, with the result that driving
under the influence of cannabis has become a major public
health problem.25 The debate whether cannabis’ harms
outweigh its benefits has generated considerable social,
political, and legal controversy for the last 60 years.26
22. See, e.g., Tamar Todd, The Benefits of Marijuana Legalization and
Regulation, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 99, 102 (2018). Potential therapeutic uses of
cannabis include pain relief, treatment of chemotherapy-induced nausea and
emesis, the neuropathic pain and spasticity caused by multiple sclerosis, and
AIDS-induced cachexia. See, e.g., BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 19,
at 21–49; WORLD HEALTH ORG., CANNABIS: A HEALTH PERSPECTIVE AND RESEARCH
AGENDA (1997); NAT’L ACAD. REPORT, supra note 20, at 54 tbl.2-2, 128 box 4-1
(listing conditions for which marijuana is a treatment for which there are varying
degrees of scientific support); Gemayel Lee et al., Medical Cannabis for
Neuropathic Pain, 22 CURRENT PAIN & HEADACHE REPS. 8 (2018) (“Nearly 20
years of clinical data supports the short-term use of cannabis for the treatment
of neuropathic pain.”). See generally Larkin & Madras, supra note 7, at 566–71
(collecting studies arguing that cannabis has analgesic properties).
23. See, e.g., Sabet, supra note 5, at 86.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 111–37.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 138–44.
26. In addition to the publications cited elsewhere in this Article, see, for
example, INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE
218 (Janet E. Joy et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter INST. OF MED.]; OFF. OF NAT’L
DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, MARIJUANA MYTHS AND FACTS: THE TRUTH BEHIND 10
POPULAR MISCONCEPTIONS (2004); MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING,
supra note 4; WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 22; SEAN BEIENBURG, PROHIBITION,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND STATES’ RIGHTS (2019); WILLIAM J. BENNETT & ROBERT A.
WHITE, GOING TO POT: WHY THE RUSH TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA IS HARMING
AMERICA (2015); MITCH EARLEYWINE, UNDERSTANDING MARIJUANA: A NEW LOOK
AT THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2002); TODD GARVEY & BRIAN T. YEH, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43034, STATE LEGALIZATION OF RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA
(2014); JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA: THE NEW PROHIBITION (1970); MARK A.R.
KLEIMAN, MARIJUANA: COSTS OF ABUSE, COSTS OF CONTROL (1989); Magdalena
Cerdá et al., Medical Marijuana Laws in 50 States: Investigating the Relationship
Between State Legalization of Medical Marijuana and Marijuana Use, Abuse and
Dependence, 120 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 22 (2012); Wayne Hall, What
Has Research Over the Past Two Decades Revealed About the Adverse Health
Effects of Recreational Cannabis Use?, 110 ADDICTION 19 (2014); Alex Kreit,
Comment, The Future of Medical Marijuana: Should the States Grow Their
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By comparison, until recently the number of economic,
commercial, or regulatory issues generated by cannabis has
been relatively small. The reason is that for most of the last
century, federal and state law have uniformly treated
marijuana as contraband, a substance that was illegal to
grow, sell, or possess for any purpose.27 As a result, there was
no need to decide how to regulate a commercial marijuana
market, since there can be no lawful sale of an item that the
criminal code outlaws.
Starting in the 1960s, however, cannabis use became an
alternative to alcohol as a source of relaxation for Baby
Boomers and a potent political symbol of a generation
rebelling against the status quo.28 There was a serious
discussion whether to revise federal and state law to treat
cannabis like alcohol and tobacco, also dangerous products
that nonetheless can be sold under government regulation.29
Neither Congress nor the state legislatures completely
restructured their approach to marijuana, although some
localities effectively “decriminalized” its possession in small
quantities by treating it as a minor infraction similar to a
traffic or moving violation punishable only by a small fine.
Marijuana trafficking, however, remained a serious crime
under federal and state law.
In 1996, that uniformity disappeared. California voters
Own?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1787 (2003). See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr.,
Introduction to a Debate: “Marijuana: Legalize, Decriminalize, or Leave the
Status Quo in Place?,” 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 73 (2018) (summarizing
arguments pro and con). That output will continue because of the differences
between federal and state law, as discussed below. See, e.g., Rosalie Liccardo
Pacula & Eric L. Sevigny, Marijuana Liberalization Policies: Why We Can’t Learn
Much from Policy Still in Motion, 33 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 212 (2014).
27. See supra note 1.
28. See Larkin, Reflexive Federalism, supra note 10 (manuscript at 2–3).
29. See, e.g., MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 4;
BLOOMQUIST, supra note 4; MARIJUANA, supra note 4; GRINSPOON, supra note 4;
KAPLAN, supra note 26; PACKER, supra note 4, at 333 (“A clearer case of
misapplication of the criminal sanction would be difficult to imagine.”);
ROSEVEAR, supra note 4; SCHOFIELD, supra note 4; THE MARIJUANA PAPERS, supra
note 4.
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enacted a statewide initiative—Proposition 215, also called
the Compassionate Use Act—that became the nation’s first
state-law based “medical marijuana” program.30 The
initiative authorized cannabis to be grown, sold, and used in
California to treat various medical conditions.31 Since then,
more than 30 other states have followed suit with their own
medical-use regulatory schemes.32 Atop that, more than a
dozen states, including California, have gone a step further
by allowing cannabis to be sold for purely recreational use—
that is, merely to obtain the euphoric effect that THC
produces.33 States in that category regulate marijuana in
much the same way that they treat cigarettes and alcohol.
The result is this: With respect to the legality of
cannabis, to borrow from Cicero, we have one law for Athens
and one for Rome. More than 60 percent of the states have
turned what once was only a black market operation into an
open, quasi-legitimate field of business. To be sure,
marijuana distribution is still a crime under the federal
CSA.34 But the U.S. Department of Justice has gone back and
forth on whether, when, and how to enforce the CSA,35 and

30. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2021).
31. Larkin, Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 106.
32. See supra note 4.
33. Larkin, Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 106.
34. The Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242
(current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904). A “controlled substance” is “a drug or
other substance, or immediate precursor, included in Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V
of part B of this subchapter,” except for “distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages,
or tobacco, as those terms are defined or used in subtitle E of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). The Controlled Substances Act
incorporates the definition of a “drug” from the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).
35. The Obama Administration Justice Department issued memoranda
adopting enforcement guidelines that attempted to afford the banking industry
some relief from its fear of dealing with businesses in the cannabis industry. The
federal courts had an opportunity to offer some clarification of this matter in
Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 861 F.3d
1052 (10th Cir. 2017), but could not reach agreement. By a 2-1 vote but without
a majority opinion, the court’s per curiam opinion dismissed without prejudice a
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Congress has treated the inconsistency between federal and
state law as if it were the plague, something to be avoided at
all cost.36 As far as marijuana enforcement is concerned, the
Drug Enforcement Administration has essentially been
relegated to the sidelines for an indefinite period.
Where does that leave us? The states have the ball when
it comes to setting cannabis policy, and they have generally
decided to allow private enterprises to control the means of
production and sale, albeit under different types and degrees
of state regulation. Complicating the regulatory framework
are differences among states as to the type and amount of
local regulation that counties and cities may impose atop
state rules.37 The next part will summarize what the
cannabis business looks like today.

credit union’s suit against the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank to be permitted to serve
the cannabis industry. Each member of the three-judge panel majority gave a
different reason for the court’s order, so the ruling effectively offers no guidance
on the banking issues. In any event, in January 2018 U.S. Attorney General Jeff
Sessions rescinded the earlier Justice Department memoranda. See Larkin,
Reflexive Federalism, supra note 10 (manuscript at 6–7, 6 n.31). Accordingly,
banks are back to square one—viz., they are again at risk of criminal liability for
offering their services to the marijuana industry. In 2019, the House of
Representatives passed the Secure and Fair Enforcement Banking Act of 2019
(the SAFE Banking Act of 2019), H.R. 1595, 116th Cong. (2019), which would
allow financial institutions to service marijuana businesses in states where the
substance is lawful. See H.R. Rep. No. 116-104, pt. 1 (2019). The Senate did not
act on the House bill in the 116th Congress.
36. Larkin, Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 108.
37. See Mikos, supra note 16, at 720 (“[S]tates are now facing growing
opposition from within their own borders. Citing concerns over marijuana’s
perceived harms, many local communities in marijuana legalization states are
seeking to reinstate marijuana prohibitions at the local level. Communities in at
least twelve marijuana legalization states have already passed local bans on
marijuana dispensaries. Even in Colorado, arguably the state with the most
liberal marijuana policies, more than 150 municipalities have passed ordinances
banning the commercial sale of marijuana. And countless other communities that
otherwise welcome or at least tolerate the marijuana industry are nonetheless
attempting to regulate it, imposing their own idiosyncratic rules concerning the
location, size, hours, signage, security, and goods sold and taxes paid by local
vendors.” (footnote omitted)).
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B. The Contemporary Cannabis Business
The discord between federal and state law (or, in some
cases, between state and local law) has an effect beyond
cannabis growers and sellers. Like any industry, businesses
need assistance from other companies for a host of ancillary
services. As a result, the states’ decisions to legalize the
commercial sale of marijuana under their own laws has
created not only a cannabis industry, but also a support
industry that also operates in a gray zone between lawful
and illegal enterprises because that industry assists
cannabis growers and sellers.38 Every company that does
business with the cannabis industry, even ones that supply
only electricity or water, is in that zone and, to some degree,
is at risk of being charged with aiding and abetting criminal
activity, even though they would otherwise never be
characterized as furthering the commission of a crime.
Clarification of the law would help the owners, officers, and
employees of such companies to know whether they are at
risk of federal criminal liability for selling their products or
offering their services to state-legal businesses.
For example, the people who own the facilities necessary
to grow, package, transport, or distribute cannabis—
colloquially known as “ganjapreneurs”—hire employees or
use independent contractors for different responsibilities,
such as in-store sales.39 In some instances, the cannabis
industry has merely increased the need for already existing
services—such as web design, app creation, marketing,
transportation, and delivery—that any firm producing a new

38. Compare, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1940)
(ruling that a party who furnishes innocuous supplies (sugar, cans, etc.) to an
illicit distiller is not guilty of conspiracy “even though his sale may have furthered
the object of a conspiracy to which the distiller was a party but of which the
supplier had no knowledge”), with, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 703, 711 (1943) (distinguishing the “articles of normal trade” in Falcone from
the sale of “narcotic drugs” and other “restricted commodities” that have an
“inherent capacity for harm”).
39. See, e.g., CORT, supra note 11, at 34–49; GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 2.
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consumer product must use.40 Some retailers combine the
sale of marijuana with other products, opening (for instance)
coffee shops that also sell cannabis.41
State regulatory programs might create a need for allied
enterprises focused specifically on the cannabis industry.42
Some programs require cannabis to be tracked from “seed to
sale,” which has led tech companies to create tracking badges
and software so that companies can prove that they are not
black marketeers.43 Some state regulators require that
companies have insurance. Since not every well-known
insurance company is willing to sell coverage to firms that
break federal law on an ongoing basis, new firms have arisen
to take advantage of this opportunity.44 Regulation can also
include a requirement to test batches for toxins, pesticides,
solvents, and other contaminants, which lead some

40. See GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 108; Jelena Milenkovic, Dosing CBD Oil
with Droppy Calculator App, LEGAL READER (June 23, 2020),
https://www.legalreader.com/dosing-cbd-oil-with-droppy-calculator-app/. Home
delivery is a problem for cannabis retailers. The U.S. Postal Service, United
Parcel Service, and FedEx won’t deliver marijuana, and companies like Amazon
have to date steered clear of entering that service line. See SUMMERS, supra note
11, at 66. Retailers are essentially limited to brick-and-mortar stores with “carry
out” service or local delivery companies. Id.
41. See REGAN, supra note 11, at 41.
42. Such as books, magazines, and websites focused on cannabis business
issues. See, e.g., ALYSON MARTIN & NUSHIN RASHIDIAN, A NEW LEAF: THE END OF
CANNABIS PROHIBITION 120–21 (2014); ED ROSENTHAL, MARIJUANA GROWERS
HANDBOOK (2010); MARIJUANA VENTURE: THE JOURNAL OF PROFESSIONAL
CANNABIS GROWERS AND RETAILERS, https://www.marijuanaventure.com (last
visited June 5, 2020); cf. ANDREA DRUMMER, CANNABIS CUISINE: BUD PAIRINGS OF
A BORN AGAIN CHEF (2017).
43. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 120; Davide Fortin, Cannabis
Cannibalization: Is the Recreational Market Appealing to Patients in Colorado?
(Nov. 2015) (M.Sc. thesis, Copenhagen Business School) (ResearchGate)
(describing Colorado’s tracking program). There might be some slippage,
however, in some of the tracking systems. See Chris Halsne, Missing Marijuana:
Weed Disappearing from Licensed Dispensaries, Not All Cheaters Get Caught
FOX31 (May 1, 2017, 8:51 PM), https://kdvr.com/news/problem-solvers/missingmarijuana-weed-disappearing-from-licensed-dispensaries-not-all-cheaters-getcaught/.
44. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 121–24.
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entrepreneurs to create cannabis-testing labs.45 State and
local packaging and labeling requirements—for example,
rules demanding that bags be child resistant, resealable, and
opaque—have led to the creation of companies to fill
retailers’ need.46 Finally, entrepreneurs in states with
recreational-use marijuana laws have created “cannabis
tourism” businesses for people who want to “live on the edge”
for a few days or just smoke some dope.47
Companies in this industry also have the same general
need for lawyers, accountants, public relations advisors,
political consultants, policy advocates, lobbyists, and ballot
organizers that every other firm in a regulated industry must
use whether to learn or change the law, obtain a license, or
satisfy complex state and local rules.48 Navigating the line

45. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 212-3:4-105 to 212-3:4-135 (2020);
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 61-63; Anna L. Schwabe & Mitchell E. McGlaughlin,
Genetic Tools Weed Out Misconceptions of Strain Reliability in Cannabis Sativa:
Implications for a Budding Industry, 1 J. CANNABIS RSCH. 14 (2019) (“strain
inconsistency is evident and is not limited to a single source, but rather exists
among dispensaries across cities in multiple states”).
46. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 212-3:3-1005 to 212-3:3-1020 (2020);
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 124-25; Robert A. Mikos, The Evolving Federal
Response to State Marijuana Reforms, 26 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 11 (2020); Julie
Weed, Two Retirees Create Marijuana Packaging Business in Colorado, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/business/small
business/cannabis-pot-entrepreneurs-marijuana-colorado.html?searchResult
Position=34.
47. See, e.g., Susan G. Hauser, Cannabis Tourism Is on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES
(July 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/travel/marijuana-vacationtravel-cannabis-usa.html?searchResultPosition=10.
48. See MARTIN & RASHIDIAN, supra note 42, at 121 (noting the emergence of
an organization, the National Cannabis Industry Association, and a law firm,
Vincente Sederberg LLC, to serve the cannabis industry); GELUARDI, supra note
11, at 124; SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 25 (“Licensing is so complex and laborious
that many cannabis businesses devote themselves to it.”); id. at 29 (“An American
business deals in laws and regulations along with buying for a dime and selling
for a dollar. Cannabis does so much more because of the federal/state gap. This
lends a unique flavor to the cannabis industry—whether advocates, lobbyists,
prosecutors, regulators, business advisors, or criminal defense specialists—
everything cannabis related starts moving with, moves through, moves around,
is moved by, and stops with lawyers.”); id. at 102–03; Patricia E. Salkin &
Zachary Kansler, Medical Marijuana Meets Zoning: Can You Grow, Sell, and
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between quasi-legitimate business and drug dealing is tricky
and requires legal guidance49 and political allies.50 In fact,
given the odd state of their business under federal and state
law, their need might even be greater than that of a company

Smoke That Here?, PLAN. & ENV’T L., Aug. 2010, at 3, 3–8 [hereinafter Salkin &
Kansler, Medical Marijuana Zoning] (describing various municipal location
restrictions, licensing processes, and operational and promotional rules). Not
surprisingly, some former state regulators have switched over to the private
sector to serve as consultants to states with their own new marijuana programs.
See J.B. Logan, For This Guy, States Are His Biggest Customers, in LEGAL
MARIJUANA: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC BENEFITS, RISKS AND POLICY APPROACHES
64, 64–69 (Joaquin Jay Gonzalez III & Mickey P. McGee eds., 2019) (describing
the “technocratic expertise” that Andrew Freedman, former Colorado “state
marijuana czar,” and Lewis Koski, former Colorado Department of Revenue
Director of Marijuana Enforcement and one of Freedman’s partners, offer states
building out their own cannabis programs).
49. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 46 (“As most industry leaders point out,
the cannabis industry is not just risky, but complex for a garden-variety
businessman. One prominent cannabis business attorney describes the
Controlled Substances Act as the Lawyer’s Full Employment Act because of the
sheer volume of restrictions, the federal/state gap, and the countless snags from
cannabis business bans and moratoriums. In short, the legal complexity of the
cannabis industry almost forces entrepreneurs to work with attorneys.” (footnote
omitted)).
50. Companies in the cannabis industry have some allies to help them
negotiate their way through the political maze. Members of the cannabis industry
rely on the policy, lobbying, and public relations assistance of private
organizations devoted to their cause, as well as the financial support that certain
wealthy philanthropists provide them. For example, there are the “four horsemen
of cannabis”: the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (or
NORML), the Drug Policy Alliance, the Marijuana Policy Project, and the
National Cannabis Industry Association. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 34–41. They
hold ideological views supportive of marijuana legalization and seek (among
other things) to create a favorable intellectual, social, and political climate for
medical and recreational marijuana use. Id. Ideological allies also seek to
dissuade the public from holding negative images of drug use and convince people
that the “drug war” cure is worse than the disease. One such organization is the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). While not focused on cannabis
legalization, the ACLU serves as “a well spring of cannabis legalization
arguments.” Id. at 33. Individuals such as hedge fund manager George Soros and
Progressive Insurance founder Peter Lewis were some of the largest funders for
the early cannabis initiatives. Id. Not surprisingly, there are organizations, such
as Smart Approaches to Marijuana, and wealthy individuals, such as the recently
deceased Sheldon Adelson, along with private pro-law enforcement
organizations, who oppose cannabis legalization and contribute their ideas, time,
and money to those efforts. Id. at 41–46.
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manufacturing and selling a consumer product that is lawful
everywhere.51 For example, local zoning rules can limit the
available business locations, thereby making it expensive to
purchase or rent storefront property for their peculiar
business.52 If the success to any business is “location,

51. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Legal Advice for Marijuana Business
Entities, in MARIJUANA FEDERALISM, supra note 14, at 155–69. As one journalist
colorfully put it:
The only thing separating legal pot from drug war pot is a state-issued
license, the magical portal through which a black marketer can dance to
become a media-anointed entrepreneur in exchange for licensing fees,
taxes, and agreeing to play by certain rules, called regulations.
The growing, selling, and testing of cannabis are the market’s
gatekeepers and state governments’ insurance policy against the feds.
The federal government’s Cole Memo made it clear that states’ rights
only exist for the states that make sure the black market isn’t involved.
To make sure the new industry doesn’t invoke an army of DEA agents
and IRS auditors, state licensing programs make sure [that] no buds get
packed in pipes, no oils get vaped, no brownies get eaten without a chain
of licensed farmers, retailers, and testers keeping the cannabis supply
in traceably legal sources only.
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 55–56.
52. See, e.g., HAGESETH, supra note 11, at 54-55; SUMMERS, supra note 11, at
80-81; Kyle A. Harvey, Even Marijuana Needs a Zone: Utah’s H.B. 3001 as the
Next Battleground for Zoning Ordinances and State Medical Marijuana Laws, 34
BYU J. PUB. L. 43, 49–50 (2020); Sam Kamin, Medical Marijuana in Colorado
and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 147, 162 (2012); Ian Morrison, Comment, Where to Put It? The Confusing
Question of How to Deal with Marijuana Dispensaries, 3 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV.
79, 84–85 (2013); Jeremy Nemeth & Eric Ross, Planning for Marijuana: The
Cannabis Conundrum, 80 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 1 (2014); Patricia E. Salkin &
Zachary Kansler, Medical Marijuana Zoned Out: Local Regulation Meets State
Acceptance and Federal Quiet Acquiescence, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 295 (2011)
[hereinafter Salkin & Kansler, Local Regulation]; Salkin & Kansler, Medical
Marijuana Zoning, supra note 48, at 3–8. Compare, e.g., City of Riverside v.
Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Ctr., Inc., 300 P.3d 494, 506 (Cal.
2013) (rejecting argument that state medical marijuana laws bar localities from
banning or regulating retail cannabis distribution), with, e.g., Ter Beek v. City of
Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 541 (Mich. 2014) (accepting same argument). For
example, some localities treat retail marijuana facilities as a “nuisance” because
cannabis distribution is illegal under federal law. Others limit retail facilities to
business, commercial, or industrial zones or impose various other restrictions,
such as limiting the number of retail facilities or requiring that facilities be a
particular distance from schools. See Salkin & Kansler, Local Regulation, supra,
at 301–19; Salkin & Kansler, Medical Marijuana Zoning, supra note 48, at 3–5.
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location, location,” cannabis retailers need the help of real
estate specialists to find an affordable location that is
accessible to clients, but distant from schools and tolerable
to their neighbors.53
In other cases, the quasi-legalized cannabis industry has
generated the growth of businesses that previously existed
only in the shadows.54 Hydroponic supply stores,
construction companies specializing in building “grow
rooms,” and trade schools teaching the mechanics of
operating a cannabis business are just a few examples.55
Marijuana “brokers” (“dealers” has become passé) bridge
growers and retailers or auction cannabis at a “pot

53. See, e.g., Salkin & Kansler, Medical Marijuana Zoning, supra note 48, at
3–4 (noting that some municipalities prohibit dispensaries within a particular
distance of a school, church, child care facility, park, playground, drug or alcohol
rehabilitation facility, halfway house, residential area, or other dispensaries);
Beth DeCarbo, Homeowners Raise a Stink Over Pot-Smoking Neighbors, WALL
ST. J. (May 7, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/homeowners-raise-astink-over-pot-smoking-neighbors-11588852854?mod=searchresults&page=1&
pos=7; Zusha Elinson, Fights Over Where to Grow Marijuana Cause Stink in
California, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2019, 12:01 PM), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/fights-over-where-to-grow-marijuana-cause-stink-in-california11568301226?mod=searchresults&page=6&pos=13. Some landlords, however,
see cannabis growers and processors as good for their bottom line. See Esther
Fung, Essential Marijuana Sellers Are a Good Business for Their Landlords,
WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/essentialmarijuana-sellers-are-a-good-business-for-their-landlords-11591099202?cx_test
Id=3&cx_testVariant=cx_2&cx_artPos=1#cxrecs_s. In fact, during the 2020
COVID-19 pandemic, “More than 20 states have designated the cannabis
industry to be essential, allowing medical marijuana dispensaries, and in some
cases recreational facilities, to stay open during shelter-in-place orders.” Id.
54. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at xiv (“Illegal for nearly a century,
legalization is dropping cannabis into something that will turn a formerly
countercultural icon into commerce as usual. More than 80 years of prohibition
means cannabis missed out on technological and industrial advances that would
have given consumers more choice. With nearly every other agricultural product,
consumers have a variety of value-added products—potatoes become Lays, corn
becomes Maker’s Mark, yucca is processed to make aloe-packed skin care
products. With cannabis, consumer demand in the regulated market is only
starting to produce value-added products.”).
55. See GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 106–08 (noting the birth of an insurance
company offering protection against “theft, spoilage, and equipment
breakdown”).
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clearinghouse.”56
The industry also needs certain services that result from
the fact that trafficking is still illegal under federal law.
Growers and retailers57 cannot use the federal banking
system and the facilities of interstate finance to raise capital
through initial public offerings,58 to accept online orders, to
make bank deposits, or to start employee retirement plans.59
56. REGAN, supra note 11, at 65–66.
57. There is a difference between companies that are in some way related to
the cannabis business and companies that cultivate and sell smokable or edible
cannabis. “The NASDAQ exchange lists several publicly traded cannabis
companies, but the companies are mostly involved in industrial production rather
than retail or grow operations. Indeed, the publicly traded companies associated
with cannabis have more ties to the pharmaceutical industry than cannabis
production and distribution.” SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 78. Among those
companies, for example, is GW Pharmaceuticals, a United Kingdom-based
biotech company with a cannabis-based epilepsy drug. Id. Those companies have
only an “ancillary” connection to cannabis. “They focus on packaging, hydroponic
gear, business and legal consulting, distribution, etc.” They also have an
established track record in non-cannabis business. Id. at 79.
58. If they could, smaller businesses, particularly ones in a region where a
statute or regulation limits the number of retail stores, might expand their
operations considerably. See, e.g., Christopher Caldwell, Do We Really Want a
Microsoft of Marijuana?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/08/31/opinion/sunday/marijuana-legal-states-federal.html?searchResult
Position=22.
59. Julie Anderson Hill, Banks and the Marijuana Industry, in MARIJUANA
FEDERALISM, supra note 14, at 139–54. Because banks cannot lend start-up
businesses money, private venture capital firms and others have stepped into the
breach. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 71–82; Ciara Linnane, Cannabis
Company Acreage Enters Funding Agreements for up to $60 Million,
MARKETWATCH (June 1, 2020, 7:55 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
cannabis-company-acreage-enters-funding-agreements-for-up-to-60-million2020-06-01?cx_testId=3&cx_testVariant=cx_2&cx_artPos=6 (noting that an
American cannabis company raised $60 million via two funding arrangements,
one with “an unnamed institutional investor,” the other through “a private
placement”); Heather Mack, Snoop Dogg-Backed Startup Offering Loans to
Cannabis Companies, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2019, 6:48 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/snoop-dogg-backed-startup-offering-loans-tocannabis-companies-11571783193?mod=searchresults&page=4&pos=19;
Heather Mack, Cannabis Startup Raises $100 Million With Eyes on Expansion,
Wall St. J. (June 28, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cannabisstartup-raises-100-million-with-eyes-on-expansion-11561735833?mod=search
results&page=8&pos=2; Vipal Monga et al., Marijuana’s Money Man, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 20, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/marijuanas-money-
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National banks cannot offer those services to firms that grow
or sell cannabis in retail outlets without violating the federal
controlled substances and money laundering statutes.60
Unable to take advantage of those payment mechanisms,
firms in the cannabis industry initially operated on a strictly
cash basis (but now have found some work-arounds, such as
debit cards).61 Consequently, stores loaded with currency or
an easily sellable commodity need to use armed private
security services to deter robberies or burglaries (not always
successfully62), as well as to transport and store large
quantities of cash.63
man-11576869335?mod=searchresults&page=3&pos=13.
60. See HAGESETH, supra note 11, at 75–84; SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 76–
78. Some small, local, state-chartered banks have taken the criminal liability
risks associated with accepting deposits. See id. at 72; see also Tom Angell, More
Banks Working with Marijuana Businesses, Despite Federal Moves, FORBES (June
14, 2018, 9:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2018/06/14/morebanks-working-with-marijuana-businesses-despite-federalmoves/#3b508e6f1b1b; Caldwell, supra note 58.
61. Cannabis companies have also resorted to using “Bitcoin,” a
cryptocurrency, or “Potcoin,” a cryptocurrency geared to cannabis. SUMMERS,
supra note 11, at 80. At one time, retailers had to operate on a “cash only” basis
because they could not allow parties to make purchases via credit cards, but debit
cards have largely resolved that issue. Conversation with Garth Van Meter,
former Director of Legislative Affairs, Smart Approaches to Marijuana (June 26,
2020).
62. See GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 82 (“According to a report prepared by
LAPD narcotics detective Dennis Packer, numerous dispensaries had been
robbed despite elaborate security precautions. In fact, the report claimed, some
dispensaries hired gang members with long criminal histories as security
guards.”); id. at 84–85 (describing a dispensary robbery and murder); HAGESETH,
supra note 11, at 94–97; SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 65–66, 116–18; Gordon
Oliver, Where Will Legal Marijuana Industry STASH Its CASH?, in LEGAL
MARIJUANA, supra note 48, at 56, 57 (“‘It’s no secret that people in the medical
marijuana field have been robbed quite often,’ said Scott Jarvis, director of
Washington’s Department of Financial Institutions.”); Sophie Quinton, Why
Legal Marijuana Businesses Are Still Cash Only, in LEGAL MARIJUANA, supra
note 48, at 61 (“Since Colorado fully legalized marijuana in January 2014, the
Denver Police Department has logged over 200 burglaries at marijuana
businesses, as well as shop lifting and other crimes.”).
63. Struggling cannabis businesses cannot take advantage of the federal
bankruptcy laws to stay afloat or reorganize, a problem that has arisen due to
the 2020 pandemic-caused recession. See, e.g., Jonathan Randles, Justice
Department Blocks ‘Essential’ Marijuana Workers from Bankruptcy Protection,
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What might surprise members of the ancien régime are
three features of the contemporary cannabis industry. One is
that, according to several commentators, the “counterculture
pioneers, outlaws, and rebels of a generation ago” no longer
are the face of the cannabis industry.64 “Young
entrepreneurs with newly minted business degrees” are
running the show.65 The people running companies in the
cannabis industry far more closely resemble recent 2020
MBA graduates than members of the 1950s Beat Generation
or 1960s Hippies.66
Related to that fact is another one. Large businesses
likely will replace the backyard growing enterprises that
(along with smugglers) supplied the pre-1996 demand for
marijuana.67 Corporate growers, producers, and distributors,
WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2020, 3:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justicedepartment-blocks-essential-marijuana-workers-from-bankruptcy-protection11590694160?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=4; Jonathan Randles, U.S. Says
Employee at Cannabis Staffing Agency Can’t Use Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
30, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-says-employee-at-cannabisstaffing-agency-cant-use-bankruptcy-11556648808;
Jonathan
Randles,
Randles’s Take: Justice Department Just Says No to Marijuana Businesses
Reorganizing in Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2018, 6:01 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/randless-take-justice-department-just-says-no-tomarijuana-businesses-reorganizing-in-bankruptcy1537480896?mod=article_inline.
64. GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 5.
65. Id. at 4–5.
66. See, e.g., CORT, supra note 11, at 34 (“These guys don’t wear tie dye and
carry clipboards. They are lobbyists and privileged white guys (seriously, they
are all white and rich) in $5,000 suits carrying smartphones and being followed
by personal assistants. They drive Mercedes not Subarus and have more money
. . . than you and I will ever see in our lives, all stored up for one reason: to get
you to consume, and keep consuming, THC.”); GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 96 (“[A]
new generation of professionals was flocking to the medical marijuana industry
from successful careers in science, corporate America, and the ministry. By
taking prominent jobs as lobbyists, managers, teachers, and nonprofit
fundraisers, they were helping to mainstream the industry’s image.”); id. at 105
(noting that “the business side of the cannabis industry was making the
transition from a social movement to a commercial enterprise”); HAGESETH, supra
note 11, at 43–44.
67. Indeed, if Congress were to legalize marijuana distribution, the tobacco
companies and other large-scale entities might expand their product lines. See,
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particularly ones that operate in multiple states, can achieve
economies of scale unattainable by simple “mom and pop”
operations,68 and they can afford both the experts necessary
to grow a commercially competitive product69 and the
phalanx of lawyers, accountants, lobbyists, and the like
necessary to maintain (and expand) their quasi-legal status
e.g., HAGESETH, supra note 11, at 8, 182; SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 135–36;
Alexander Gladstone, Why One of the World’s Largest Tobacco Companies Is
Struggling,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Feb.
19,
2020,
6:02
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-one-of-the-worlds-largest-tobacco-companiesis-struggling-11582068998?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=9; Vipal Monga,
Legal Pot Sales Are Off to Slow Start in Canada, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2019, 8:00
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/legal-pot-sales-are-off-to-slow-start-incanada-11555156800?mod=article_inline (“Canada is the first Group of Seven
country to embrace legalization, joining 10 states in the U.S., although cannabis
is still banned under U.S. federal law. Its move has promoted several big U.S.
brands like Marlboro maker Altria Group Inc. and brewers like Constellation
Brands Inc. to invest in Canadian growers.”); Carol Ryan, Weed Versus Greed on
Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2019, 2:14 PM) [hereinafter Ryan, Weed Versus
Greed], https://www.wsj.com/articles/weed-versus-greed-on-wall-street-1154841
2203?mod=article_inline (“Marlboro cigarette maker Altria last month
announced a $1.8 billion investment in a grower following an almost $4 billion
bet by Corona brewer Constellation Brands in August. Executives at Coca-Cola
and Pepsi have said publicly they are closely watching how the business
develops.”).
68. See, e.g., DAVENPORT, supra note 11, at 173–94; HAGESETH, supra note 11,
at 46 (according to one industry member, “the key to success in this business was
growing the marijuana”); REGAN, supra note 11, at 69 (posing “one of the big open
questions about the future of cannabis: will big commercial grows push out small
artisans . . . ? Will legalization bring with it an industry like most agricultural
products, with small farmers crushed by huge factory farms, or like the market
for alcohol, which mixes high-end specialty brewers with international
conglomerates?”); Hall & Lynskey, supra note 2, at 181; Carol Ryan, Cannabis
Investors Are Zoning Out About Supply, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2019, 5:11 AM)
[hereinafter Ryan, Cannabis Supply], https://www.wsj.com/articles/cannabisinvestors-are-zoning-out-about-supply-11561626711?mod=searchresults&page
=8&pos=3 (“The current need to cultivate cannabis in individual states to serve
the local market is highly inefficient. Producers with operations in multiple
states would be able to consolidate in regions with the consistently sunny
conditions that the cannabis plant likes.”).
69. See JOHN HUDAK, MARIJUANA: A SHORT HISTORY 12 (2d ed. 2020)
(“Although cannabis can grow under a variety of conditions, if a grower wishes to
maximize a plant’s productivity and ensure that its chemical composition is
consistent and true to its strain (an important aspect of cannabis grown
commercially for the production of marijuana), success requires research, care,
frequent attention, and horticultural and agricultural know-how.”).
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under state law while fending off the federal Leviathan from
snuffing out the industry.70 Descheduling, rescheduling, or
outright legalization of marijuana would greatly alter the
commercial aspects of the industry.71
The third fact is the enormous variety of cannabis strains
and THC-infused products available for sale today.72
Cannabis “came of age,” so to speak, in the 1960s as a symbol
of an intergenerational protest. The image of someone in his
or her 20s or 30s smoking a joint could well serve as a
representation of that generation’s attitudes toward thencontemporary social and political culture. Users can still
smoke cannabis as a “joint” (botanical marijuana in

70. See CORT, supra note 11, at 30–31, 34–36, 132–33; SUMMERS, supra note
11, at 56 (“On purpose or by accident, the regulations also tend to make the
cannabis industry very hard on Mom and Pop. Combined with the larger
problems of the federal/state gap, licensure and regulations have a way of choking
out smaller players who can’t keep up with the expense of regulation, leading, as
in other businesses, to more and more businesses buying out, vertically
integrating, and franchising to give cannabis its own class of top dogs. Across the
nation, the top dogs’ rules get spread out.”); id. at 69 (“The industry has gotten
more consolidated as it developed. In Colorado, 20 percent of the cannabis
business licenses are owned by only 10 people, most of whom secured their
franchises by buying out smaller companies.” (footnote omitted)). Five companies
dominate the cannabis market in Canada, which legalized recreational-use
marijuana in 2019. See Jacquie McNish & Vipal Monga, Wall Street’s Marijuana
Madness: ‘It’s Like the Internet in 1997,’ WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2018, 12:00 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-streets-marijuana-madness-its-like-theinternet-in-1997-1537718400?mod=article_inline (“There are more than 120
marijuana companies listed on Canadian stock exchanges, but the sector is
dominated by five companies, whose total market value has catapulted from less
than $4 billion to nearly $40 billion in the past year.”). Of course, just as
Budweiser’s dominant position has not prevented the rise of microbreweries, so
too might small, boutique cannabis stores avoid being absorbed or underpriced
by larger companies. See HAGESETH, supra note 11, at 205.
71. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 140 (“Federal legalization would open
opportunities to the average businessperson and to the most massive banking
systems alike. Entrepreneurs could find loans easily. Companies could go public
and move product across state lines. Big Cannabis would happen.”).
72. See, e.g., CORT, supra note 11, at 31; HUDAK, supra note 69, at 12–13 (“[A]n
entire cottage industry has emerged around marijuana genetics, which involves
the cross-pollination or cross-breeding of different strains and even different
species of cannabis to produce new hybrid strains.”); Larkin, Gummy Bears,
supra note 9, at 318–20 (discussing the variety of edible THC-infused products).
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wrapping paper) or a “blunt” (botanical marijuana wrapped
in tobacco), by using a “bong” (a pipe or water pipe), or by
vaporizing THC via an Electronic Nicotine Delivery Device
(ENDD or e-cigarette).73 Yet, today numerous food products,
known as “edibles,” also contain THC.74 In addition to the
Alice B. Toklas brownies popular in the 1960s, numerous
food products—such as coffee, tea, soda, cookies, candies,
caramels, lozenges, salad dressing, marinara sauce, and
others—contain THC.75 As one commentator put it, a
“cannabis culinary professional can infuse just about
anything you want to eat with THC,” and the variety of
available THC-infused food products is “a real testament to
American entrepreneurialism and innovation.”76
Those facts illustrate that the image of a twentysomething smoking a doobie at the 1969 Woodstock music
festival is no longer an accurate representation of today’s
marijuana users, let alone the people who created and
expanded that business after 1996. On the contrary,
marijuana legalization is potentially a huge business for
private parties and a new source of revenue for states.77
73. Recently, however, ENDDs, particularly when used by minors, have been
associated with E-cigarette or Vaping Use-Associated Lung Injury. See, e.g.,
Editorial, The Vaping-Marijuana Nexus, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 25, 2019, 1:43 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-vaping-marijuana-nexus-11577299411?mod=
searchresults&page=3&pos=11.
74. See, e.g., GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 31.
75. See, e.g., CORT, supra note 11, at 31; REGAN, supra note 11, at 41; Larkin,
Gummy Bears, supra note 9, at 318–19, 319 nn.15–16.
76. HUDAK, supra note 69, at 18–19.
77. Thompson, supra note 11, at 60 (“The legalization of recreational
marijuana has proven to be a very lucrative decision for the American economy.”);
see also, e.g., Ciara Linnane, Aurora Cannabis and Aphria Stocks Look More
Attractive After Canopy Growth’s Friday Selloff: Cantor Fitzgerald,
MARKETWATCH (June 1, 2020, 7:04 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/
story/aurora-cannabis-and-aphria-stocks-look-more-attractive-after-canopygrowths-friday-selloff-cantor-fitzgerald-2020-06-01?cx_testId=3&cx_testVariant
=cx_2&cx_artPos=6; Ryan, Weed Versus Greed, supra note 67 (“Serious money is
now flooding into marijuana. In the fourth quarter of 2018 alone, $7.9 billion of
capital was raised by cannabis companies globally, according to the Viridian
Cannabis Deal Tracker—nearly twice the amount raised in all of 2017.”).
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Estimates from a few years ago were quite bullish. Wall
Street predicted that marijuana legalization would generate
billions of dollars in revenues for private growers and
distributors, create thousands of jobs in the cannabis
business, and produce millions in government revenues from
taxes and fees.78 Some more recent reports were bearish on

78. See, e.g., Debra Borchardt, Marijuana Industry Projected to Create More
Jobs than Manufacturing by 2020, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2017, 10:51 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2017/02/22/marijuana-industryprojected-to-create-more-jobs-than-manufacturing-by-2020/ (“A new report from
New Frontier Data projects that by 2020 the legal cannabis market will create
more than a quarter of a million jobs. This is more than the expected jobs from
manufacturing, utilities or even government jobs, according to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. The BLS says that by 2024 manufacturing jobs are expected to
decline by 814,000, utilities will lose 47,000 jobs and government jobs will decline
by 383,000. This dovetails with data that suggests the fastest-growing industries
are all healthcare related. The legal cannabis market was worth an estimated
$7.2 billion in 2016 and is projected to grow at a compound annual rate of 17%.
Medical marijuana sales are projected to grow from $4.7 billion in 2016 to $13.3
billion in 2020. Adult recreational sales are estimated to jump from $2.6 billion
in 2016 to $11.2 billion by 2020.”); Rory Carroll, Hippy Dream Now a BillionDollar Industry with California Set to Legalize Cannabis, GUARDIAN (Dec. 30,
2017, 3:30 PM), https://amp.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/30/californialegalise-cannabis-hippy-dream-billion-dollar-industry (“The Salinas Valley, an
agricultural zone south of San Francisco nicknamed America’s salad bowl, has
already earned a new moniker: America’s cannabis bucket. Silicon Valley
investors and other moneyed folk are hoping to mint fortunes by developing
technology to cultivate, transport, store and sell weed. Entrepreneurs are
devising pot-related products and services. Financiers are exploring ways to fold
the revenue—estimated at $7bn per annum by 2020—into corporate banking.”);
Chris Morris, Legal Marijuana Sales Are Expected to Hit $10 Billion This Year,
FORTUNE (Dec. 6, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/06/legal-marijuana-sales-10billion/; Aaron Smith, Market for Legal Pot Could Pass $20 Billion, CNN
BUSINESS (Nov. 11, 2017, 7:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/09/
news/economy/marijuana-legalization-sales/index.html (“Voters in four states
approved legal recreational pot on Tuesday. Four more states expanded access to
medical marijuana. All told, it could expand the national market to $21 billion by
2020, according to New Frontier Data, which partnered with the marijuana
industry organization Arcview Group. That is up from $5.7 billion last year and
an expected $7.9 billion this year.”); Aaron Smith, Colorado Passes a Milestone
for
Pot
Revenue,
CNN
MONEY
(July
19,
2017,
2:52
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/19/news/colorado-marijuana-tax-revenue/index
.html (“VS Strategies, a pro-legalization research company in Denver, says that
the state has pulled in $506 million since retail revenues began in January
2014. . . . Revenue from taxes and fees has increased each year, from $76 million
in 2014 to $200 million last year, and the state is on track to beat that this year,
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the cannabis industry,79 but it appears to have survived the
2020 recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.80
Were cannabis to become a legalized commodity
throughout the United States, over time the economy might
come to treat it in the same manner as it handles tobacco or
alcohol, analogous consumer products given their addictive
according to VS Strategies, which used state revenue data in its report
Wednesday.”).
79. See, e.g., Daniel Chase, Will These Marijuana Stocks Start To Rebound?,
MARIJUANASTOCKS.COM (June 4, 2020), https://marijuanastocks.com/will-thesemarijuana-stocks-start-to-rebound/; Max A. Cherney, Pot Stocks Plunge after
Another Round of Disappointing Earnings, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 30, 2020, 2:48
PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/pot-stocks-plunge-after-anotherround-of-disappointing-earnings-2020-03-30?cx_testId=3&cx_testVariant=
cx_2&cx_artPos=6; Charley Grant, Cannabis Stocks Take a Hit, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 3, 2020, 11:19), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cannabis-stocks-take-a-hit11583252358?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=16; Chris Kornelis, A CEO Tries
to Navigate the Legal Cannabis Sector’s Bad Trip, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2020, 1:08
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-ceo-tries-to-navigate-the-legal-cannabissectors-bad-trip-11583518019?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=5;
Jacquie
McNish & Vipal Monga, Marijuana Madness Turns into Cannabis Crash, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/marijuanamadness-turns-into-a-cannabis-crash-11570888800?mod=article_inline;
Alexander Osipovich, Cannabis Stocks Fall on Disappointing Earnings, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 14, 2019, 4:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cannabis-stocks-fall-ondisappointing-earnings-11573754223?mod=article_inline.
80. See, e.g., Editorial, California Deems Pot an Essential Coronavirus
Business, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2020, 7:25 PM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/california-deems-pot-an-essential-coronavirus-business-11585005903?
mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=3; Max A. Cherney, Pot Shops Are Considered
‘Essential’ Businesses in Most States Where It’s Legal, but the Rules Are Shifting,
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 11, 2020, 2:04 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/
story/pot-shops-are-considered-essential-businesses-in-most-states-where-itslegal-but-the-rules-are-shifting-2020-04-08; Gwynn Guilford, Guns, Groceries
and News: What Sells in a Pandemic—and Doesn’t, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2020,
11:31 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/groceries-guns-and-news-what-sells-ina-pandemicand-what-doesnt-11585042200?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=1
(“Cannabis: Consumers are turning to cannabis too, according to data from
Weedmaps, the nation’s largest legal cannabis marketing platform. On March 19,
Weedmaps’ Travis Rexroad said the site’s users placed a record number of orders
on the platform, surpassing sales volume booked last year on April 20, an
unofficial day of cannabis celebration. The company has also noticed a growing
share of orders for edible products, which can be discreetly consumed.”);
Cannabis Sales Surge During Lock Down, CANNABIS NEWS WIRE (June 24, 2020),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cannabis-sales-surge-during-lockdown-301082604.html.
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potential, as explained below. Even so, the market would
eventually treat the marijuana industry as just another
business and cannabis as merely another item whose
growers and sellers must navigate through the commercial
and political worlds.81 That would not eliminate the need for
specialists to guide firms through the statutes, rules, and
policy preferences that federal, state, and local government
officials would use to regulate commerce instead of the
prohibitions currently in the CSA. Legalization would only
reduce or eliminate the risk of criminal liability; it would not
ease a company’s way to earn a profit or avoid the burden of
complying with regulatory mandates.
II. CANNABIS REGULATORY ISSUES
A. Traditional Cannabis Regulatory Issues
The debate over federal marijuana legalization
occasionally seems like a binary choice between polar
opposite approaches: allowing large-scale private ownership
and commercialization of the means of production and
distribution82 versus recommitting the nation to an
81. As one member of the industry put it:
In the U.S. commercial world, cannabis will grow more complex than
an ear of corn, which by itself doesn’t matter commercially or politically
as much as farmers insurance for the corn grower, agricultural political
action committees (PACs) that hunt for corn subsidies, ethanol for
automobiles, high fructose corn syrup to save the U.S. sweet-lovers from
Cuban sugarcane embargoes, irrigation equipment manufacturers,
stock prices on one of hundreds of byproducts or direct supply chains and
distribution networks from Nebraska to Maine and all the trucking and
shipping companies that go with them, seed patents, and John Deere
tractors. International commerce doesn’t care about ears of corn,
either—it cares about export agreements, global shipping magnates,
political stability, commodity futures, and food security for citizens and
for key allies.
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at xiv.
82. That was what happened in the tobacco industry. See, e.g., ALLAN M.
BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY (2007); ROBERT N. PROCTOR, GOLDEN
HOLOCAUST: ORIGINS OF THE CIGARETTE CATASTROPHE AND THE CASE FOR
ABOLITION (2011). Taking advantage of the cost-savings from the invention of a
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overwhelming use of law enforcement in a crackdown on
everyone who grows, distributes, or uses cannabis. Of course,
numerous options fall between those extremes.83 In all
likelihood, that middle ground is where any serious debate
over the future of cannabis legalization would be conducted.
Most existing state cannabis programs fall into that
intermediate range,84 and every intermediate approach
cigarette-rolling machine, James Buchanan Duke acquired roughly 250 tobacco
companies and created the American Tobacco Company, which produced
approximately 80 percent of all the cigarettes sold in the United States. See
United States v. Am. Tobacco. Co., 221 U.S. 106, 155–75 (1911). The same type
of consolidation is likely to occur in the cannabis industry because larger firms
can take advantage of economies of scale that small boutique shops cannot. Hall
& Lynskey, supra note 2, at 181. In fact, that might be happening already. See
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 14–15 (“[T]he cannabis industry is growing more
stratified to reflect similar industries in agriculture, alcohol, tobacco, or
pharmaceuticals. At the tip of the pyramid are those from the well-capitalized
and well-established business and political worlds who are trying to fold their
knowledge and lessons and experience into the new industry. Lower on the free
market totem pole are the former black market actors, bootstrapped mom-andpop shops, and independent contractors.”).
83. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 83 (“Fundamentally, state and
national governments can either let the market work as independently as
possible or take a very acting hand in restricting it. States can legalize only
medical cannabis, limit the number of licenses in a given area, only allow
nonprofits, set prices or control the supply, and take 100 other routes to keep the
market under control.”); Hall & Lynskey, supra note 2, at 179 (“In principle, adult
cannabis use could be legalized in a range of different ways. Individuals could be
allowed to grow cannabis for their own use and gift it to others. They could be
allowed to form cannabis growers’ clubs that produce cannabis solely for their
members’ use. The government could create a monopoly in cannabis production
and sales in order to minimize the promotion of cannabis use, as some US states
and Canadian provinces have done with alcohol. The government could license
non-profit cooperatives or charitable cooperatives that produce and sell cannabis
without making a profit. Finally, governments could allow the commercialization
of cannabis production and sale under a for-profit model like that used for
alcohol.” (footnote omitted)).
84. See MARTIN & RASHIDIAN, supra note 42, at 70 (“While [California’s]
Proposition 215 went into effect as a single page of untouched text, newer laws
. . . were not implemented until more than one hundred pages of rules were
added.”). Most states permitting recreational use of cannabis treat it like alcohol:
they limit its sale to adults, while regulating the businesses that cultivate and
distribute it. That approach is well known, convenient and consistent with the
theory that cannabis is no more harmful than alcohol. See SUMMERS, supra note
11, at 58; Hall & Lynskey, supra note 2, at 180.
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involves formal regulation by a state agency of some kind.85
No state gives businesses free rein to sell anything and
everything they might generate however they want. States
have traditionally regulated local businesses since the
colonial era86 under their inherent “police power.”87 That
choice is a sensible and necessary one here too, for several
reasons. Regulations allow the state to argue to the federal
government that it is protecting consumers against
charlatans and dangerous consumer goods. Regulation
allows the state to earn income from licensing fees. And
regulation provides enough of a state-action veneer that it
might keep federal law enforcement officials at bay. A
laissez-faire approach to cannabis distribution would be
tantamount to encouraging private parties to flout the CSA
at will, and the federal government would not sit idly by
while marijuana traffickers rake in beaucoup bucks from
illegal sales. Sergeant Schultz’s willful blindness was
entertaining for viewers of “Hogan’s Heroes,”88 but the DEA
will not laugh at someone who makes it look inept or

85. The absence of regulation, or the use of an inadequate regulatory system,
could lead to a “Wild West” state of affairs. GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 82
(“Instead of reining in dispensaries, the poorly crafted moratorium turned Los
Angeles into a medical marijuana boomtown. Within two years of the
moratorium’s effective date, more than 800 dispensaries were operating in Los
Angeles. They opened in upscale business districts; near schools, playgrounds,
and youth centers; and in high-crime neighborhoods. And without an ordinance
requiring a criminal background check, many observers wondered whether some
dispensaries were little more than covers for illicit drug dealing.” (footnote
omitted)).
86. See, e.g., FRANK BOURGIN, THE GREAT CHALLENGE: THE MYTH OF LAISSEZFAIRE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 50 (1989). See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The
Original Understanding of “Property” in the Constitution, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 1,
61-80 (2016) [hereinafter, Larkin, Property] (summarizing economic regulation
in the nation’s salad days).
87. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905) (describing
the states’ “police power”).
88. See generally Des Hammond, The Very Best of Sergeant Schultz, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OsXrpxo4uC0 (referencing
Hogan’s Heroes (CBS television broadcast 1965–71)).
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foolish.89
Governments have traditionally justified regulation on
economic and consumer safety rationales. Price regulation is
necessary in sectors where there is a natural monopoly—that
is, industries, such as railroad service, where it is inefficient
to allow more than one company to operate. Governments
license only one firm, but regulate the prices it can charge to
prevent monopoly pricing.90 Product quality regulations
protect consumers against hazardous goods. They ensure
that a product is carefully grown or constructed; that it does
not contain defects, toxins, impurities, or anything else that
could harm consumers; and that it is appropriately packaged
and labeled so that a purchaser knows what he or she is
buying and what ingredients or components it contains, as
well as prevent minors from easily accessing a potentially
dangerous item.91 As discussed below, states have relied on
both rationales to regulate this industry.
Treating cannabis as a medicine or a consumer good
involves far more than simply removing marijuana from the
penal code.92 There are numerous policy questions regarding
89. Apparently, not everyone got that message. See, e.g., GREG CAMPBELL,
POT, INC.: INSIDE MEDICAL MARIJUANA, AMERICA’S MOST OUTLAW INDUSTRY ix–xi
(2012); GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 92 (“The most embarrassing setbacks for the
industry . . . were dispensary owners who behaved like big-shot drug dealers
rather than compassionate caregivers. It was well known in the medical cannabis
industry that the DEA frowned upon dispensary owners who promoted their
businesses on a large scale, flaunted their wealth, or took on the flamboyant
characteristics of illicit drug dealers. Yet some dispensary owners couldn’t resist
the temptation.”); id. at 93–96 (describing how the DEA pursued such parties).
90. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15 (1982) (“The
most traditional and persistent rationale for governmental regulation of a firm’s
prices and profits is the existence of a ‘natural monopoly.’ Some industries, it is
claimed, cannot efficiently support more than one firm.”).
91. See id. at 33–34 (discussing “moral hazard” (viz., where goods affect third
parties) and “paternalism” (viz., where consumers make improvident decisions)
as bases for regulation).
92. See, e.g., JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA
LEGALIZATION: INSIGHTS FOR VERMONT AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS xiii (2015)
[hereinafter CAULKINS, INSIGHT] (“Legalization is not simply a binary choice
between making the production, sale, and possession of the drug legal on the one
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the implementation of any such program that elected
officials should answer.93 Among them are the following:
•

Should a state adopt a medical-use program, a
recreational-use program, or both?94

hand and continuing existing prohibitions on the other. Legalization
encompasses a wide range of possible regimes, distinguished along at least four
dimensions: the kinds of organizations that are allowed to provide the drug, the
regulations under which those organizations operate, the nature of the products
that can be distributed, and price. These choices could have profound
consequences for the outcomes of legalization in terms of health and social wellbeing, as well as for job creation and government revenue.”); SUMMERS, supra
note 11, at xv (“In the black market, cannabis was untracked and untraced but
largely uncomplicated: grow pot, sell pot, avoid cops. When and if cannabis
becomes legal, it becomes part of the mix between corporate juggernaut and the
leviathan, something inconceivably more complex.”).
93. For a comprehensive and thoughtful discussion of the implementation
issues, see CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 101–14. See also, e.g., JONATHAN
P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW
(2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA]; Caulkins, Marijuana
Dangers, supra note 16, at 33; Benedikt Fisher et al., Commentary, Considering
the Health and Social Welfare Impacts of Non-medical Cannabis Legalization, 19
WORLD PSYCHIATRY 187 (2020); Beau Kilmer, Policy Designs for Cannabis
Legalization: Starting with the Eight Ps, 40 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 25961 (2014); Kleiman, Marijuana and Public Health, supra note 16, at 78; Mark
A.R. Kleiman, How Not to Make a Hash Out of Cannabis Legalization, WASH.
MONTHLY (Mar./Apr./May 2014) [hereinafter Kleiman, Cannabis Hash],
https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchaprilmay-2014/how-not-tomake-a-hash-out-of-cannabis-legalization/; Rosario Queirolo, Commentary, The
Effects of Recreational Cannabis Legalization Might Depend upon the Policy
Model, 19 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 195 (2020).
94. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 83–84 (“The biggest commercial
difference is medical vs. recreational. Most nations start with medical programs,
and U.S. states follow the same pattern. This not only takes some pressure off
the black market, but establishes the groundwork for a more well-oiled
recreational machine further down the line (though some states and nations deny
they have any interests).”) If a state adopts only a medical-use program, the
question arises whether the legislature, an implementing agency, or a treating
physician should decide for what conditions cannabis can be recommended.
Numerous physicians have argued that cannabis is a legitimate medical
treatment for a host of ailments. See, e.g., DAVID BEARMAN WITH MARIA PETTINATO,
CANNABIS MEDICINE: A GUIDE TO THE PRACTICE OF CANNABINOID MEDICINE (2019);
DAVID CASARETT, STONED: A DOCTOR’S CASE FOR MEDICAL MARIJUANA (2015);
PATRICIA C. FRYE WITH DAVE SMITHERMAN, THE MEDICAL MARIJUANA GUIDE:
CANNABIS AND YOUR HEALTH (2018); BONNI GOLDSTEIN, CANNABIS REVEALED
(2016); THE POT BOOK, supra note 11; MICHAEL H. MOSKOWITZ, MEDICAL CANNABIS
(2017); J. Michael Bostwick, Clinical Decision, Medicinal Use of Marijuana—
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What type of agency should be tasked with
regulating the cannabis industry—for example, a
state public health department or its revenue
department?95

Recommend the Medical Use of Marijuana, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 866, 866–68
(2013); Jerome P. Kassirer, Editorial, Federal Foolishness and Marijuana, 336
NEW ENG. J. MED. 366 (1997). Yet, there are risks in handing the decision entirely
over to physicians. Some states have broadly defined or loosely applied medical
cannabis program laws that are just a sham for legalized recreational use. See
MARTIN & RASHIDIAN, supra note 42, at 66–67 (“Proposition 215, as written and
passed, was exceedingly vague. The law allowed unlimited cannabis for any
condition. Odorous flatulence? A viable excuse. Chronic hangnail? You bet. Only
a doctor’s note stood between Californians and legal cannabis; for the first time
they were able to possess, grow, or consume as much as they wanted.”); Paul J.
Larkin, Jr., Medical or Recreational Marijuana and Drugged Driving, 52 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 453, 509–12 (2015) [hereinafter Larkin, Drugged Driving].
California’s Compassionate Use Act identified permissible conditions for which a
physician could recommend marijuana (e.g., chemotherapy-induced nausea), but
also contained a catchall provision allowing a physician to recommend it for any
condition for which he thought it might be useful. Provisions like that are an
invitation to recommend marijuana to treat anything, even just “feeling a little
blue” one day. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 83–84. Other ancillary issues are
whether to require patient registration with the state; whether a patient (or his
“caregiver”) can or must grow his own cannabis; how much cannabis or how many
plants someone can possess or grow; whether to allow private businesses to open
cannabis dispensaries (and, if so, on a for-profit or not-for-profit basis) but limit
their number; and so forth. Id. at 86–88. In theory, medical and recreational
programs could create very different markets. Id. at 84 (“Medical programs do
not create the same kind of roaring commercialism the recreational cannabis
industry produces. More often, medical programs simply produce an array of
oligopolies that are then poised to corner the recreational market when that state
decides to go all the way with its policy. In terms of money, the recreational
industry is king.”). Some states with both programs tax medical cannabis
purchases at a lower rate than recreation-use purchases. Those states have to
ensure that people are not obtaining medical-use cards simply to avoid paying
taxes. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Rules for the Marijuana Market, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/opinion/high-time-rules-for-themarijuana-market.html?searchResultPosition=14 (“States with an existing
medical marijuana market will also have to make sure that users are not abusing
it to evade taxes. In Colorado, for example, there are more than 111,000 people
with medical marijuana cards. Those users can buy the drug at much lower tax
rates [7.62%] than people buying recreational marijuana [21.12%] . . . . The
problem is that almost anyone can get a card on a doctor’s recommendation.”).
95. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-3 (LexisNexis 2020) (vesting regulatory
authority in the Marijuana Enforcement Division of the Colorado Department of
Revenue). That choice is an important one. A state health department will focus
on enhancing the safety of the product and the health of its consumers, while a
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•

Should the forms and potency of cannabis be
limited or left to market forces?96

•

Should each person be permitted—or required—to
grow cannabis for his or her personal medical or
recreational use, or should private enterprises be
free to become involved?97

•

Should the industry be freely open to all comers or
should there be a limited number of growers and

state revenue department will seek to raise state revenue above all else. See, e.g.,
CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 102 (“One might expect, as a general rule,
that a liquor-control board (such as in Washington) might be more cognizant of
the special circumstances surrounding a dependence-inducing intoxicant than
would, say, a department of revenue, as in Colorado, which might be more focused
on good governance that is mindful of matters of process and equitable treatment
across licensees. One might also expect that neither would necessarily have as
much of a proactive focus on protecting public health as a health or child-welfare
agency would. Thus, it is useful and important to consider the role (and perhaps
leadership or co-leadership) of a public health–minded state agency.”); cf. Carol
Ryan, Pot Industry Underestimates Old-School Dealers, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19,
2019, 7:34 AM) [hereinafter Ryan, Old-School], https://www.wsj.com/articles/potindustry-underestimates-old-school-dealers-11566214441?mod=searchresults
&page=7&pos=3 (“Several factors are stymieing legitimate sales. . . . [T]he main
barrier is the markup on legal cannabis from high taxes and the cost of complying
with complex regulations. Consumers pay 77% more for the same product from a
legal vendor, according to BDS Analytics. Unless taxes are cut, the research
house expects almost half of California’s cannabis spending to remain in the
illegal market in 2024.”).
96. Cannabis can be sold in a traditional cigarette-like format or in numerous
other forms, including a variety of edible forms. The potency of marijuana has
increased greatly since the Summer of Love in 1968, when it was in the low single
digits. Today, potency can vary from 30 to 90-plus percent. CAULKINS, INSIGHT,
supra note 92, at 106–08; Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 9, at 318–21, 319
nn.15–16, 337–38, 337 nn.56–62.
97. Vermont and the District of Columbia allow individuals to grow cannabis
for their own use or to give it away, but they prohibit its sale. See, e.g., Hall &
Lynskey, supra note 2, at 180. Most states with recreational use laws allow each
person to grow a limited number of plants per person (say, 6) or per household
(say, 12). SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 59; see, e.g., id. at xiii–xiv (“What’s good for
industry is good for legalization campaigns, and vice versa. Behind pot
legalization is a fresh, new industrial complex all its own. The states that have
had the most success and received the most press are those with the commercial
recreational model, rather than the more highly controlled medical options or less
consumerist decriminalization options practiced by other states. Consumer
choice, profit motive, and need for taxes accelerated the cannabis reform
movement to its present American speed.”).
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distributors?98
•

What qualifications should exist for a licensee? In
particular, should a criminal record (especially for
drug trafficking) be a disqualification?99

•

How should a state license and inspect growers

98. Legalization options include the following: allowing small-scale
cooperatives to combine resources for members, limiting the number of growers
and retailers in a state or county, deciding whether to allow companies to
vertically integrate and operate cultivation facilities and retail stores, deciding
whether to allow counties to supplement state regulation, deciding whether to
use the criminal justice system to police the cannabis business or turn
enforcement over to a civil regulatory agency, deciding what licensing scheme is
optimal, deciding whether to allow delivery service, and so forth. See, e.g.,
CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 108–09, 111–12; Bajaj, supra note 94 (“For
each level of the industry, licensing systems ought to discourage the
concentration of market power in the hands of a few businesses. It’s important
for regulators to recall the American experience with the tobacco industry, which
is dominated by a handful of large corporations. For decades, those big cigarette
companies undermined scientific research into the damage their products were
causing and blocked sensible regulations. If states allow marijuana businesses to
become too big, they could face corporate juggernauts that may be hard to
regulate.”). Most states allow commercial businesses to enter the industry. See,
e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at xiii–xiv; cf. GELUARDI, supra note 11, at 88
(describing a 2010 Los Angeles ordinance limiting the number and location of
medical marijuana dispensaries). The number of licensees could affect the supply
and therefore the price. See, e.g., Ryan, Cannabis Supply, supra note 68 (“When
adult use was legalized in Oregon four years ago, too many growing licenses were
issued. That has led to excess inventory—6.5 years’ worth, according to a 2019
Oregon Liquor Control Commission report. The price paid by consumers for
usable marijuana has more than halved to less than $5 a gram in the past two
years.”). A large number of retail stores might be positively associated with
increased cannabis use. See, e.g., CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 108 (“The
alcohol literature suggests that alcohol outlet density is positively associated with
the prevalence of alcohol-related problems . . . . There is suggestive evidence that
marijuana could experience a similar fate: States that allow medical-marijuana
dispensaries experience a higher adult prevalence rate.” (citations omitted)).
99. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 212-3:2-205 to 212-3:2-280 (application and
licensing rules), 212-3:5-105 to 212-3.5-730 (medical marijuana stores), 212-3:6105 to 212-3:6-115 (retail marijuana stores) (LexisNexis 2020). That issue is
particularly salient in connection with efforts to increase minority ownership of
companies in the cannabis industry. The argument is that minorities have borne
the brunt of the drug war, a disproportionate number of Blacks and Hispanics
therefore have criminal records, and treating that fact as a disqualification for
ownership interest would have a disproportionate adverse effect on minorities.
See, e.g., Beau Kilmer & Erin Kilmer Neel, Being Thoughtful About Cannabis
Legalization and Social Equity, 19 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 194 (2020).
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and distributors and, in general, enforce the new
regulatory program?100
•

What, if any, price regulations should be
adopted?101

100. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 212-3:8-105 to 212-3:8-130 (enforcement),
§§ 212-3:8-205 to 212-3:8-240 (discipline) (LexisNexis 2020); CAULKINS, INSIGHT,
supra note 92, at 114 (“Enforcement of regulations will fall on a variety of
agencies, as described in greater detail in Chapter Seven, and is likely to involve
the cost of regulating licenses (growing, processing, distributing, and retail
selling), regulating products (testing inspections, product availability in stores,
random compliance checks), checking compliance and enforcing marketing
regulations, regulating sales to out-of-state residents, regulating sales to and
possession by minors, and regulating use and possession (e.g., in public parks, in
restaurants.”). “Regulators usually chop the cannabis industry into a handful of
licenses that match a particular business type. Depending on the state, these
licenses can include retail, cultivation, testing, transportation, production,
manufacturing, or medical care givers.” SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 58. For a lay
overview of the marijuana licensing requirements and process, see id. at 56–59.
A slow licensing process, whether accomplished intentionally or otherwise, can
stall a nascent industry.
101. Price controls are like taxes. They are inversely related to demand and
directly related to the presence of a black market. See, e.g., DAVENPORT, supra
note 11, at 143–48; Tom James, The Failed Promise of Legal Pot, A TLANTIC
(May 9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/legalpot-and-the-black-market/481506/ (“[W]hat is keeping people in Colorado’s
black market is price, with a dose of convenience thrown in, says Mark
Vasquez, a former narcotics detective . . . . ‘The black market,’ he says, ‘is
alive and well and will continue to thrive in Colorado.’ There are a few basic
reasons for this. First, the medical market, Vasquez says, can sell
marijuana more cheaply than the state-licensed and -regulated stores
because medical dispensaries don’t have to charge most of the combined 27.9
percent tax on the drug. This increases the resale of medical marijuana on
the street. Second, there are the plants that are grown for personal use,
which are allowed under the law. Vasquez says the result is a steady supply
of marijuana not only for street dealers but also for Craigslist sales, which
have become so ubiquitous that some city departments don’t have the
resources to crack down on them.”); James Queally & Patrick McGreevy,
Nearly 3,000 Illegal Marijuana Businesses Found in California Audit, Dwarfing
Legal
Trade,
L.A.
TIMES
(Sept.
11,
2019,
5:14
PM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-11/california-marijuana-blackmarket-dwarfs-legal-pot-industry (“California’s black market for cannabis is at
least three times the size of its regulated weed industry, according to an audit
made public Wednesday, the latest indication of the state’s continued struggle to
tame a cannabis economy that has long operated in legal limbo. . . . Legitimate
marijuana businesses have repeatedly criticized state leaders and law
enforcement for failing to curb unlicensed dispensaries and delivery services,
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•

Should localities be able to impose their own
regulations, or even ban cannabis sales altogether
under a so-called “local option”?102

•

What state and local tax rules are appropriate? In
particular, what is the appropriate tax rate?103

which sell cannabis at a much lower price by skirting state and municipal
cannabis taxes.”).
102. See CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 110; SUMMERS, supra note 11, at
25–26 (“Most states with legal pot let local government create their own
regulations, including an option to opt out of state law and keep cannabis illegal
within their borders. So far [viz. as of 2018] only Washington does not allow local
opt-out options, though several towns in Washington do so anyway. This creates
layers and layers of complexity and cost. For example, a retail shop in Denver
must go through two separate licensing ordeals—one from the Colorado
Marijuana Enforcement Division and one from the City of Denver—pay taxes to
two different entitles, and adjust the business to two different sets of zoning
standards—all the while complying with whatever they must do to stay out of the
federal spotlight.”). If a state empowers localities to add their own regulations, a
locality will need to decide how to zone for cannabis growing or retail operations.
One decision that a city or country must make is whether it should spread out or
concentrate retail cannabis stores. Each option has costs and benefits. For
example, concentrating them in an area zoned for industrial use might keep them
away from schools, playgrounds, and parks, but it might blight one area and drive
up the real estate market. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 57.
103. See, e.g., CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 115–43; SUMMERS, supra
note 11, at 95–103; JOSEPH HENCHMAN & MORGAN SCARBORO, TAX FOUND.,
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION AND TAXES: LESSONS FOR OTHER STATES FROM COLORADO
AND WASHINGTON (Special Rep. No. 231, 2016). Some politicians tout cannabis
legalization as a way of boosting state treasuries through so-called “sin” taxes.
Joseph De Avila, Connecticut Governor Pitches Legalizing Marijuana, Other
Measures in Budget, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/
story/cannabis-company-acreage-enters-funding-agreements-for-up-to-60million-2020-06-01?cx_testId=3&cx_testVariant=cx_2&cx_artPos=6. Most states
with legalized cannabis impose an excise tax on producers and a sales tax on
retailers based on the retail price. Prices have fallen since the state legalization
programs came on board, because in those states there is no need for a surcharge
to offset the risk of state criminal liability. A weight-based tax approach would
incentivize retailers to offer higher THC content products, such as extracts with
70 percent or greater THC content. Pricing the THC content or imposing a
minimum unit price could reduce that incentive, but no state has yet done so.
Deciding what the tax rate should be is a tricky issue. Set the rate too low and
you fall short of projected receipts. Set the rate too high and you encourage black
market sales. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 13–14, 97–98; Hall & Lynskey,
supra note 2, at 180–81; Bajaj, supra note 94 (“Regulators will have to design
policies that allow licensed businesses to undercut the illegal market but keep
prices high enough so dependence on the drug does not increase a lot.”). Of course,
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Should tax receipts be dedicated to a particular
fund, such as treatment of cannabis dependence
or other state or local government functions, such
as schools, social services, or public employee
salaries?104

Elected officials, of course, have a powerful incentive to
answer as few of those questions as possible. Every decision
risks antagonizing some of the electorate (or their donors),105
large amounts of “loose cash” floating around the cannabis industry make it
difficult to determine whether firms are paying what they owe. Quinton, supra
note 62, at 61.
104. See, e.g., Marijuana Tax Reports, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
https://cdor.colorado.gov/data-and-reports/marijuana-data/marijuana-taxreports (March 2021) (reporting approximately $223 million in overall revenue
from marijuana sales for FY 2019 (Jan. 1 to Sept. 30, 2019) and approximately
$1.2 billion from February 1, 2014 (when the Colorado Department of Revenue
began reporting data) to December 2019); Heather Gillers, Is Your City’s Pension
Fund a Little Short? Marijuana Might Help, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-your-citys-pension-fund-a-little-shortmarijuana-might-help-11580812201?mod=searchresults&page=3&pos=14.
As
for the use of cannabis tax receipts: Sales and income taxes generate income for
local and state governments that can be used for cannabis treatment programs
or the myriad other state budget items. Yet, in the long term cannabis
legalization could leave states and localities in the red due to the costs of
marijuana use, such as increased emergency room expenses from motor vehicle
accidents and overdoses, as well as lost income as the number of long-term users
increases (particularly, ones who initiated cannabis use during their
adolescence). See CENTENNIAL INST., ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS OF LEGALIZED
MARIJUANA 3 (2018) (“For every dollar gained in tax revenue, Coloradans spend
approximately $4.50 to mitigate the effects of legalization. Costs related to the
healthcare system and from high school dropouts are the largest cost
contributors, but many other costs were included as well. Costs of marijuana
ranged from accidental poisonings and traffic fatalities to increased court costs
for impaired drivers, juvenile use, and employer related costs.”); see also
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 100; Larkin, Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note
10, at 130–31.
105. Polls indicate that a majority of Americans favor making cannabis more
available, particularly for medical use. See, e.g., John Hudak & Christine
Stenglein, Public Opinion and America’s Experimentation with Cannabis
Reform, in MARIJUANA FEDERALISM, supra note 14, at 15–34; Zusha Elinson,
Voters Approve Recreational Marijuana in Four States, Medical Marijuana in
Three Others, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/votersapprove-recreational-marijuana-in-at-least-three-states-medical-marijuana-inothers-1478677170?mod=article_inline (“Sixty percent of Americans now favor
legalizing marijuana, according to a Gallup poll from October. That is the highest
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and no elected official eager to be re-elected will intentionally
antagonize a single-issue voting bloc, even a small one,
because such groups have an outsized effect on the political
process.106 That explains why most legalization programs
result from voter referendums, rather than the traditional
legislative process.107 The safer course is to create a new
administrative agency (or task an existing one) with the
responsibility to promulgate rules, at least in the first
instance, when implementing the new program.108 States

level of support since Gallup first asked the question back in 1969 when just 12%
of Americans supported legalization.”). Yet, that majority opinion does not
guarantee that a vote in favor of legalization avoids political risks. Elected
officials represent particular states or counties, and national polls do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of the people in those regions. The residents in
New York City and Salt Lake City might have very different views about the
wisdom of allowing cannabis to be sold for recreational use. Moreover, the people
who favor legalization do not deem this issue as a particularly important one.
Hudak & Stenglein, supra, at 31. Finally, there is always the “not-in-mybackyard” (or NIMBY) problem—viz., people who support marijuana legalization
as long as no dispensary opens in their neighborhood. See GELUARDI, supra note
11, at 86.
106. An interest group representing only a minority of voters who intensely
oppose marijuana legalization can stymie legislative steps toward legalization
despite nationwide majority support for that policy. See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW,
CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5–6, 13–17 (1974) (participants in the
political process will seek to further their own interests, rather than the “public
interest”); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971) (explaining
why, according to collection action theory, a small coherent interest group with
intensely-held views on a single issue can have more legislative influence than a
majority of the population).
107. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at xiii; Hall & Lynskey, supra note 2,
at 179. For example, in Colorado the voters authorized medical use of cannabis
in 2000 and recreational use 12 years later in separate amendments to the state
constitution. COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 14 (authorizing medical marijuana use); id.
art. 18, § 16 (authorizing adult recreational marijuana use). The state later
passed implementing legislation. See, e.g., S.B 19-224, 72d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Colo. 2019).
108. Legislators could ask a task force for recommendations on those issues.
Colorado did so after the electorate legalized recreational-use marijuana in 2012.
See, e.g., STATE OF COLO., TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
AMENDMENT 64 (2013). That would give the legislature the benefit of outside
advice, which provides some cover, but it still leaves decision-making
responsibility with elected officials.
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like Colorado have done just that.109 Once the legislature
makes that assignment, the cannabis regulatory body, like
every other administrative agency, will then govern the
industry through a combination of licensing, inspections,
enforcement proceedings, rulemaking, adjudication, advicegiving, and whatever informal “arm-twisting” agency
officials can muster.110
B. Nontraditional Cannabis Regulatory Issues
Cannabis raises concerns not present in the case of most
consumer goods. Two in particular stand out. One is that
users can consume far too much of it and become dependent
on it; the other is that people will become intoxicated by
marijuana and drive, which puts them at risk of grave injury
or death, along with passengers, pedestrians, and other

109. Colorado regulates the sale of recreational-use cannabis through the
Marijuana Enforcement Division of the Department of Revenue. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-10-101 to 44-10-1301 (West 2020); COLO. CODE REGS.
§§ 212-3:1-105 to 8-200 (LexisNexis 2020); webpage of the Marijuana
Enforcement Division, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://www.colorado.gov/
pacific/enforcement/marijuanaenforcement (last visited May 21, 2020). See
generally John Hudak, Colorado’s Rollout of Legal Marijuana Is Succeeding: A
Report on the State’s Implementation of Legalization, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 649
(2015); Sam Kamin, Colorado Marijuana Regulation Five Years Later: Have We
Learned Anything at All?, 96 DENV. L. REV. 221, 224–27 (2019) [hereinafter
Kamin, Colorado’s Regulation]. That agency has collected the relevant statutes
and rules in a manual that rivals Anna Karenina in length. Compare COLO. DEP’T
OF REVENUE MARIJUANA ENF’T DIV., COLORADO MARIJUANA LAWS AND
REGULATIONS (2020) (more than 800 pages long), with LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA
KARENINA (Rosamund Bartlett trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (1878) (896 pages
long). Some states have even agreed to establish common regional regulatory
schemes. See Joseph De Avila, Four Northeastern Governors Team Up on Vaping
and
Marijuana
Standards,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Oct.
17,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/four-northeastern-governors-team-up-on-vapingand-marijuana-standards-11571347342?mod=article_inline.
110. To be sure, creating a cannabis regulatory framework, regardless of how
strict it might be, does not eliminate all political risks. Some voters will treat any
vote in favor of a regulatory program as a tacit endorsement of cannabis use,
while others will see any restraint on its use as an arbitrary restriction on their
rights. Why? As Peter Hitchens has noted, “Cannabis is not merely a drug. It is
a cause.” PETER HITCHENS, THE WAR WE NEVER FOUGHT: THE BRITISH
ESTABLISHMENT’S SURRENDER TO DRUGS 3 (2012).
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drivers. Traditional price and quality regulation will not
prevent those harms. Other supply-side regulations are
necessary.
1. Two Problems: Cannabis Dependence and Driving
Under the Influence of Cannabis
The cannabis plant is a peculiar consumer good because
it can harm users and third parties. The reason why is that
it contains THC, the psychoactive ingredient responsible for
its euphoric effect.111 Unfortunately, for some people the
“rush” that marijuana produces is more a curse than a
blessing. Heavy or long-term cannabis use can lead to
tolerance, which requires increasing amounts of THC to
produce the desired effect.112 Heavy or long-term use can also
damage executive mental functioning,113 as well as lead
111. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF CANNABIS
54 tbl.2-2 (2017). Given its pharmacodynamics (the effect of a
drug on the body), THC certainly qualifies as a “drug” for purposes of the Federal
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938: a non-food substance consumed for the
euphoria it produces. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (“The term ‘drug means (A) articles
recognized in the official United States Pharmacopœia, official Homœopathic
Pharmacopœia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any
supplement to any of them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals;
and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function
of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended for use as a
component of any article specified in clause (A), (B), or (C).”).
AND CANNABINOIDS

112. See, e.g., CARLTON K. ERICKSON, THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION 28–30 (2d ed.
2018).
113. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE HEALTH AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF
NONMEDICAL CANNABIS USE 15 (2016) (“The daily use of cannabis over years and
decades appears to produce persistent impairments in memory and cognition,
especially when cannabis use begins in adolescence.”); JERROLD S. MEYER & LINDA
F. QUENZER, PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 416 (2d ed. 2018) (“Heavy cannabis use for a
long period of time may lead to impaired executive functioning for at least 2 to 3
weeks following cessation of use . . . . However, some of the data suggest that
heavy, long-time users may continue to show impairment in decision making,
planning, and concept formation.”); id. at 422–25 (discussing potential adverse
psychological, neuropsychiatric, and physiological effects from long-term use); id.
at 424–25 (discussing potential psychosis-causing effect of early-onset, long-term
use); CAULKINS, INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 107 (“[A] relatively small number of
heavy users account for the great bulk of total purchases; many of them have
built up a chemical tolerance to the effects of THC and need higher doses than
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users to become dependent on the drug,114 which causes them
to suffer withdrawal symptoms when they discontinue its
use.115 The 2013 edition of the American Psychiatric
other consumers to achieve the effect they desire.”); Marta Di Forti et
al., Proportion of Patients in South London with First-Episode Psychosis
Attributable to Use of High Potency Cannabis: A Case-Control Study, 2 LANCET
PSYCHIATRY 233, 236 (2015) (“People who used cannabis or skunk every day
were both roughly three times more likely to have a diagnosis of a psychotic
disorder than were those who never used cannabis.”); Marie Stefanie Kejser
Starzer et al., Rates and Predictors of Conversion to Schizophrenia or Bipolar
Disorder Following Substance-Induced Psychosis, 175 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 343, 346
(2018) (“We found that 32.2% of patients with a substance-induced psychosis
later converted to either bipolar disorder or schizophrenia. The highest
conversion rate (47.4%) was found for cannabis-induced psychosis. Young age
was associated with a higher risk of conversion to schizophrenia; the risk was
highest for those in the range of 16-25 years. Self-harm after a substance-induced
psychosis was significantly linked to a higher risk of converting to both
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.”).
114. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MARIJUANA 14 (Aug. 2017)
(“Marijuana use can lead to the development of problem use, known as a
marijuana use disorder, which takes the form of addiction in severe cases. Recent
data suggest that 30% of those who use marijuana may have some degree of
marijuana use disorder.”); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 509–16 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]
(discussing diagnosis of “Cannabis Use Disorder”); ERICKSON, supra note 112, at
175–76, 267; WAYNE HALL & ROSALIE LICCARDO PACULA, CANNABIS USE AND
DEPENDENCE (2003); MEYER & QUENZER, supra note 113, at 420 (noting that 10%
of marijuana users become dependent, while 50% of daily users do so); CANNABIS
DEPENDENCE (Roger A. Roffman & Robert S. Stephens eds., 2006); Udo Bonnet &
Ulrich W. Preuss, The Cannabis Withdrawal Syndrome: Current Insights, 8
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & REHABILITATION 9 (2017); Alan J. Budney & John R. Hughes,
The Cannabis Withdrawal Syndrome, 19 CURRENT OPS. PSYCHIATRY 233 (2006);
Itai Danovitch & David A. Gorelick, State of the Art Treatments for Cannabis
Dependence, 35 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 309 (2012); Margaret Haney, The
Marijuana Withdrawal Syndrome: Diagnosis and Treatment, 7 CURRENT
PSYCHIATRY REP. 360 (2005); Wayne Hall, What Has Research Over the Past Two
Decades Revealed About the Adverse Health Effects of Recreational Cannabis
Use?, 110 ADDICTION 19 (2014); Wayne Hall & Nadia Solowij, Long Term
Cannabis Use and Mental Health, 171 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 107 (1997); Lindsey
A. Hines et al., Association of High-Potency Cannabis Use with Mental Health
and Substance Use in Adolescence, 77 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 1044 (2020).
115. See, e.g., Anees Bahji et al., Prevalence of Cannabis Withdrawal
Symptoms Among People with Regular or Dependent Use of Cannabinoids: A
Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Apr. 2020, at 1, 11;
Alan J. Budney et al., Review of the Validity and Significance of Cannabis
Withdrawal Syndrome, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1967 (2004); Alan J. Budney et
al., The Time Course and Significance of Cannabis Withdrawal, 112 J. ABNORMAL
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Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders defines that condition as “Cannabis Use
Disorder.”116
Like most issues concerning marijuana, the subject of
dependency has been a contentious one. Some marijuana
supporters have denied that it has any potential for
dependency, and some of its opponents have claimed that it
always leads to addiction.117 The truth lies between the
extremes. Approximately ten percent of the people who ever
smoke marijuana become dependent on it, but that risk goes
up for someone who uses cannabis frequently, particularly
when regular use began during adolescence.118 According to
PSYCH. 393 (2003); Alan J. Budney et al., Marijuana Withdrawal Among Adults
Seeking Treatment for Marijuana Dependence, 94 ADDICTION 1311 (1999); Wilson
M. Compton et al., Marijuana Use and Use Disorders in Adults in the USA, 2002–
14: Analysis of Annual Cross-Sectional Surveys, 3 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 954 (2016);
David A. Gorelick et al., Diagnostic Criteria for Cannabis Withdrawal Syndrome,
123 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 141 (2012); Esme Fuller-Thomson et al., Is
Recovery from Cannabis Dependence Possible? Factors that Help or Hinder
Recovery in a National Sample of Canadians with a History of Cannabis
Dependence, ADVANCES IN PREVENTATIVE MED., Apr. 15, 2020, at 1; Deborah S.
Hasin et al., Prevalence of Marijuana Use Disorders in the United States Between
2001–2002 and 2012–2013, 72 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 1235 (2015); Deborah S. Hasin
et al., Cannabis Withdrawal in the United States: Results from NESARC, 69 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1354 (2008). Cannabis withdrawal symptoms include
craving, irritability, depression, anxiety, restlessness, weakness, and sleep
disruption. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. MILLER ET AL., TREATING ADDICTION, 39, 96 box
6.6, 290 box 18.2 (2011) (describing the symptoms of cannabis withdrawal); Alan
J. Budney et al., Comparison of Cannabis and Tobacco Withdrawal: Severity and
Contribution to Relapse, 35 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 362 (2008); M. Claire
Greene & John F. Kelly, The Prevalence of Cannabis Withdrawal and Its
Influence on Adolescents’ Treatment Response and Outcomes: A 12-Month
Prospective Investigation, 8 J. ADDICTION MED. 359, 361–62 tbl.1 (2014).
116. DSM-5, supra note 114, at 509–16 (discussing diagnosis of “Cannabis Use
Disorder”); see Alan J. Budney et al., Update on the Treatment of Cannabis Use
Disorder, in CONTEMPORARY HEALTH ISSUES ON MARIJUANA, supra note 5, at 236;
Tammy A. Chung & Ken C. Winters, Clinical Characteristics of Cannabis Use
Disorder, in CONTEMPORARY HEALTH ISSUES ON MARIJUANA, supra note 5, at 72.
117. See IVERSEN, supra note 17, at 106–13, 209–12 (noting the competing
views).
118. See, e.g., ERICKSON, supra note 112, at 267; HALL & PACULA, supra note
114, at 75–78; ROOM ET AL., supra note 5, at 25 (noting that the risk of dependence
is “around 9% among persons who have ever used cannabis”); James C. Anthony
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cannabis experts Wayne Hall and Rosalie Pacula, “the
following rules of thumb” are useful in determining the
likelihood of dependence: The risk is one in ten for people
who have ever used cannabis. Using the drug on more than
a few occasions increases the risk to between one in five and
one in three. Use it daily and the risk jumps to approximately
one in two.119 The risk is even higher for someone who begins
marijuana use during adolescence, given the labile nature of
the adolescent brain.120
et al., Comparative Epidemiology of Dependence on Tobacco, Alcohol, Controlled
Substances, and Inhalants: Basic Findings from the National Comorbidity
Survey, 2 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 244 (1994) (noting
that 9 percent of all cannabis users met the DSM-III-R criteria for cannabis
dependence at some point in their lives); Beau Kilmer, Recreational Cannabis—
Minimizing the Health Risks from Legalization, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 705, 705
(2017) (“Approximately 9% of people who try cannabis meet criteria for cannabis
dependence at some point. The rate roughly doubles for those who initiate use
before 17 years of age and is much higher for adolescents who use cannabis
weekly or more often.”); Catalina Lopez-Quintero et al., Probability and
Prediction of Transition from First Use to Dependence on Nicotine, Alcohol,
Cannabis, and Cocaine: Results of the National Epidemiological Survey on
Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC), 115 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE
120, 126 (2011) (“[C]umulative probability estimates indicated that 67.5% of
nicotine users, 22.7% of alcohol users, 20.9% of cocaine users, and 8.9% of
cannabis users would become dependent at some time in their life.”); Randi
Melissa Schuster et al., Effects of Adolescent Cannabis Use on Brain Structure
and Function: Current Findings and Recommendations for Future Research, in
CONTEMPORARY HEALTH ISSUES ON MARIJUANA, supra note 5, at 91–92 (noting
that the “lifetime risk” for cannabis dependence is “17% when use is initiated as
a teenager,” “approximately 9%” when use begins as an adult, and “25% to 50%
in those who use daily”); id. (noting that the “rate of transition from nonproblematic to problematic cannabis use may occur more rapidly with cannabis
than nicotine or alcohol use,” although fewer cannabis users progress to
dependence than nicotine or alcohol users (9 percent versus 67 and 23 percent,
respectively)).
119. HALL & PACULA, supra note 114, at 75; id. at 78.
120. According to Dr. Nora Volkow, Director of the National Institute on Drug
Abuse, “[A]s compared with persons who begin to use marijuana in adulthood,
those who begin to use in adolescence are approximately 2 to 4 times as likely to
have symptoms of cannabis dependence within 2 years after first use.” Volkow
et al., supra note 8, at 2220; see also, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE HEALTH AND
SOCIAL EFFECTS OF NONMEDICAL CANNABIS USE 15 (2016) (“The daily use of
cannabis over years and decades appears to produce persistent impairments in
memory and cognition, especially when cannabis use begins in adolescence.”);
ROOM ET AL., supra note 5, at 25 (noting that the risk of dependence is “about one
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To be sure, the risk of addiction to someone who samples
any psychoactive drug is low,121 and cannabis is not as
addictive as other drugs, such as nicotine, heroin, cocaine, or
alcohol.122 But a 10 percent risk of dependency is far from
trivial for anyone, and knowingly accepting a 50 percent risk
of dependency—a mere coin flip—would legally be deemed
reckless behavior.123 The risk to society from cannabis
in six for young people who initiate in adolescence”); id. at 31–39 (describing
studies investigating the risk that adolescent marijuana use could adversely
affect learning, result in a greater drop-out rate, be a prelude to other drug use,
or lead to schizophrenia or depression); Janni Leung et al., What Is the Prevalence
and Risk of Cannabis Use Disorders among People Who Use Cannabis? A
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 109 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 106479 (2020) (the
risk of dependence is 33 percent among young people who engaged in regular
(weekly or daily) cannabis use); Volkow et al., supra note 8, at 2220 tbl.1 (noting
that negative effects in brain development, educational outcome, cognitive
impairment, and life satisfaction are “strongly associated with initial marijuana
use early in adolescence”). See generally Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 9, at
325–31, 326 nn.30–40 (collecting authorities). Studies have found that a range
of 30-84% of juveniles seeking treatment for cannabis dependence have suffered
from withdrawal. Greene & Kelly, supra note 115, at 361–62, 366.
121. See, e.g., Jill B. Becker & Elena Chartoff, Sex Differences in Neural
Mechanisms Mediating Reward and Addiction, 44 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
166, 166 (2019).
122. See, e.g., ERICKSON, supra note 112, at 267 (noting that studies have found
the approximate figures of addiction for various commonly used drugs is the
following: of the people who smoke, 32% become addicted; for heroin, 23%; for
cocaine, 17%; for alcohol, 10-15%; for marijuana, 9%); ROOM ET AL., supra note 5,
at 25; Anthony et al., supra note 118, at 251 tbl.2 (noting comparative addiction
rates of 32% for nicotine, 23% for heroin, 17% for cocaine, 15% for alcohol, 11%
for stimulants, and 9% for cannabis); KEVIN P. HILL, MARIJUANA: THE UNBIASED
TRUTH ABOUT THE WORLD’S MOST POPULAR WEED 37 (2015) (“Put simply, this data
tells us that most people who begin using marijuana will not become addicted,
but some will. And adolescents are about twice as likely as adults to become
addicted.”); id. at 36–37, 55–63. The recent increase in the potency of cannabis,
see supra note 7, however, might push up the percentage of addicted users.
123. See, e.g., Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2278 (2016) (stating
that to act recklessly is to “‘consciously disregard[]’ a substantial risk that the
conduct will cause harm to another” (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM.
L. INST. 1962))); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994) (“The civil law
generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails
to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so
obvious that it should be known.”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 202(2)(c) (AM. L. INST.
1962) (defining “recklessness” for purposes of the General Requirements of
Culpability: “A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
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dependency is also considerable. Marijuana is the most
widely available and used illicit drug.124 As such, even a onein-ten chance of becoming dependent, let alone a 50-50
chance, means that a sizeable number of people will likely
suffer from that condition.125
The risk of dependence puts marijuana in the same
category of consumer goods as alcohol and tobacco, items
sometimes called “temptation goods.”126 Society might be

offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe
in the actor’s situation.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (AM. L. INST.
1965) (defining “reckless disregard of safety”: “The actor’s conduct is in reckless
disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an
act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of
facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct
creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk
is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent.”); id. § 500 cmt. a (“[Recklessness] must involve an easily perceptible
danger of death of serious physical harm, and the probability that it will so result
must be substantially greater than is required for ordinary negligence.”); id. § 502
(“The factors which determine when the conduct of an actor is in reckless
disregard of another’s safety are applicable to determine whether the actor’s
conduct is in reckless disregard of his own safety.”); PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 34, at 213–14 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
124. See, e.g., DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 2019 NAT’L DRUG
THREAT ASSESSMENT 77 (2019) (“As the most commonly used illicit drug . . .,
marijuana is widely available and cultivated in all 50 states.”); ROOM ET AL., supra
note 5, at 25 (“Community mental health surveys indicate that in many
developed societies cannabis dependence is the most common type of drug
dependence after alcohol and tobacco.”).
125. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA, supra note 93, at 25 (“The self-report
data suggest that 2.8 million Americans met clinical criteria for marijuana
dependence in 2013, and another 1.3 million met the criteria for abuse, for a total
of 4.1 million meeting the criteria for abuse or dependence. (That’s 1.6 percent of
the population aged 12 and older.) Estimates from Europe and Australia also find
rates of marijuana abuse and dependence in the general population between 1
percent and 2 percent.”). Fortunately, the prevalence of dependence might not be
increasing. See Wilson M. Compton et al., Cannabis Use Disorders Among Adults
in the United States During a Time of Increasing Use of Cannabis, 204 DRUG &
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 107468 (2019).
126. Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers, supra note 16, at 33.
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forced to “tolerate grudgingly” their sale because the cost of
trying to prevent people from using them by deeming them
contraband eclipses any realistically obtainable benefits
from making the effort.127 Yet, given the potential for
addiction and other harms associated with their use, society
is under no obligation to embrace them or make it easy to
purchase them. On the contrary, society is justified in
discouraging their use. If a jurisdiction decides to make a
purchaser jump through a few additional hoops not present
when purchasing, say, an iPhone to avoid impulsive or
whimsical purchases, there is no serious infringement on
individual liberty.
There is an important, related feature of that problem.
Commercialization of cannabis has increased the number of
marijuana users.128 Cannabis users, however, do not all
consume the same quantity of that drug. The evidence
indicates that a small number of users consume the vast
amount of marijuana.129 For example, a university study of

127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Caulkins, Weed Industry, supra note 15, at 28 (“As policy
liberalized, cannabis transformed from a weekend party drug to a daily habit,
becoming more like tobacco smoking and less like drinking. The number of
Americans who self-report using cannabis daily or near-daily grew from 0.9
million in 1992 to 7.9 million in 2016.”); Kleiman, Marijuana and Public Health,
supra note 16, at 76–77 (“Over the past quarter-century, the population of
‘current’ (past-month) users has more than doubled (to 22 million) and the
fraction of those users who report daily or near-daily use has more than tripled
(to about 35%). Those daily or near-daily users account for about 80% of the total
cannabis consumed. Between a third and a half of them report the symptoms of
Cannabis Use Disorder: They’re using more, or more frequently, than they
intended to; they’ve tied to cut back or quit and failed; cannabis use is interfering
with their other interests and responsibilities; and it’s causing conflict with
people they care about.”). A major cause of increased marijuana use is
commercialization. See Caulkins, Weed Industry, supra note 15, at 28 (“use in
Colorado rose not when its medical-marijuana law passed in 2000, but when
dispensaries proliferated in 2009”); Andrew A. Monte et al., The Implications of
Marijuana Legalization in Colorado, 313 JAMA 241, 241 (2015).
129. See, e.g., OR. LIQUOR CONTROL COMM’N, 2019 RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA
SUPPLY AND DEMAND LEGIS. REP. 18 (2019); Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers, supra
note 16, at 28; MARIJUANA POL’Y GRP., LEEDS SCH. OF BUS., UNIV. OF COLO.
BOULDER, MARKET SIZE AND DEMAND FOR MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: 2017 MARKET
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2016 data in Colorado prepared for the Colorado Department
of Revenue revealed that 22.5 percent of marijuana users
consumed 71.7 percent of all the cannabis used during that
year.130 A 2019 report by the state of Oregon reached the
same conclusion.131 Two experts on the subject of cannabis
found that the evidence points to a similar ratio. As the late
NYU Professor Mark Kleiman explained, “Cannabis
consumption, like alcohol consumption, follows the so-called
80/20 rule (sometimes called ‘Pareto’s Law’): 20 percent of
the users account for 80 percent of the volume.”132 Professor
Caulkins made the same point from another direction.
“[D]aily users are thought to consume (on average) the
equivalent of three to four joints per day.”133 When
marijuana consumption is measured on a total days-per-use
basis, those daily users amount to “45% of the reported days
of use and more than 50% of the weight consumed.”134 As the

UPDATE 12 tbl.1 (2018) [hereinafter 2017 MPG MARKET UPDATE]; CAULKINS ET AL.,
MARIJUANA, supra note 93, at 29; BEAU KILMER ET AL., RAND CORP., BEFORE THE
GRAND OPENING: MEASURING WASHINGTON STATE’S MARIJUANA MARKET IN THE
LAST YEAR BEFORE LEGALIZED COMMERCIAL SALES 8 (2013) (“[T]he highest
frequency users (those consuming on 21 days or more per month) utterly
dominate the quantity consumed, accounting for close to 80 percent of total
consumption.”); MILES K. LIGHT ET AL., COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, MARKET SIZE AND
DEMAND FOR MARIJUANA IN COLORADO 2–4, 2 tbl.1.1, 11–12 (2014) (hereinafter
2014 MPG REPORT]; Kleiman, Cannabis Hash, supra note 93. See generally OFF.
OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, WHAT AMERICA’S USERS SPEND ON ILLEGAL DRUGS:
2000-2010, at 103 (2014) (“Total consumption and expenditures [on drugs] are
driven by the minority of very heavy users who consume on 21 or more days each
month.”).
130. See 2017 MPG MARKET UPDATE, supra note 129, at 12 tbl.1. The same
group reached a similar conclusion in 2014. See 2014 MPG REPORT, supra note
129.
131. See OR. LIQUOR CONTROL COMM’N, supra note 129, at 18 (“Like many
markets, including for alcohol, total consumption is overwhelmingly driven by
the heaviest users through the ‘80/20 rule.’ Generally, 20% of users represent
80% of total consumption.”).
132. Kleiman, Cannabis Hash, supra note 93; see also, e.g., Rosalie L. Pacula
et al., Assessing the Effect of Medical Marijuana Laws on Marijuana Use: The
Devil is in the Details, 34 J. DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 7 (2015).
133. Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers, supra note 16, at 29.
134. Id.
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result, “it seems literally true that the average gram of
marijuana is consumed by someone who is under the
influence of marijuana more than half of all their waking
hours.”135
Those harms are not hypothetical. The marijuana
business pulls in approximately $50 billion in sales each
year.136 That spells trouble. As Professor Kleiman warned us,
“The cannabis industry, like the alcohol industry, depends on
people using more of the product than is good for them.”137
Professor Caulkins agrees. In his words, “from the
perspective of cannabis vendors, drug abuse isn’t the
problem; it’s the target demographic.”138
Cannabis dependency harms users, but it also can make
third parties suffer its consequences if users drive while
under its influence.139 THC impairs a person’s ability to

135. Id.
136. Kleiman, Marijuana and Public Health, supra note 16, at 78.
137. Id. at 83.
138. Kleiman, Cannabis Hash, supra note 93 (“Since we can expect the legal
cannabis industry to be financially dependent on dependent consumers, we can
also expect that the industry’s marketing practices and lobbying agenda will be
dedicated to creating and sustaining problem drug use patterns.”).
139. See, e.g., Robert L. DuPont et al., Marijuana-Impaired Driving: A Path
Through the Controversies, in CONTEMPORARY HEALTH ISSUES ON MARIJUANA,
supra note 5, at 183, 186 (“Today there is a wealth of evidence that marijuana is
an impairing substance that affects skills necessary for safe driving.”); Wayne
Hall, What Has Research Over the Past Two Decades Revealed About the Adverse
Health Effects of Recreational Cannabis Use?, 110 ADDICTION 19, 21 (2014);
Rebecca L. Hartman & Marilyn A. Huestis, Cannabis Effects on Driving Skills,
59 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 478 (2013); Russell S. Kamer et al., Change in Traffic
Fatality Rates in the First 4 States to Legalize Recreational Marijuana, 180 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 1119, 1120 (2020) (“[L]egalization of recreational marijuana is
associated with increased traffic fatality rates. Applying these results to national
driving statistics, nationwide legalization would be associated with 6800 (95% CI,
4200-9700) excess roadway deaths each year.”); Johannes G. Ramaekers, Driving
Under the Influence of Cannabis: An Increasing Public Health Concern, 319
JAMA 1433 (2018). See generally Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 94, at 473–
78, 473 nn.87–103 (collecting studies). What is particularly disturbing is the large
number of drivers who see no harm from “driving while stoned.” See Larkin,
Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 138–39, 139 n.155. A recent Colorado
Department of Transportation report confirms that attitude among many
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handle a motor vehicle safely if for no reason other than it
impairs his or her ability to process information and make
decisions quickly.140 That is particularly true if someone
consumes marijuana together with alcohol, which people
often do,141 because each drug amplifies the effect of the
Colorado drivers. See COLO. DEP’T OF TRANSP., THE CANNABIS CONVERSATION 5
(2020); see also MARY K. STOHR ET AL., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, EFFECTS OF
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIME: FINAL REPORT 6–7,
20 (2020) (noting that legalization in Washington State has resulted in “increased
drugged driving”); Thomas R. Arkell et al., Driving-Related Behaviours, Attitudes
and Perceptions Among Australian Medical Cannabis Users: Results from the
CAMS 18-19 Survey, ACCID. ANALYSIS & PREV. 105784 (2020) (“A key finding of
the current study is that a substantial proportion of medical cannabis users are
driving shortly after using cannabis, with some driving during the time of peak
effects when impairment tends to be greatest. More than 19.0% of users
report[ed] driving within one hour of consuming cannabis and 34.6% of all users
within 3 hours of use . . . . The finding that 71.9% of respondents felt that their
medical cannabis use does not impair their driving is consistent with previous
reports showing that cannabis users tend to perceive DUIC [Driving Under the
Influence of Cannabis] as relatively low risk, especially when compared with
alcohol.”). But see id. (“In a recent review, Celius et al. found that most patients
with multiple sclerosis-related spasticity who were being treated with nabiximols
actually showed an improvement in driving ability, most likely due to a reduction
in spasticity and/or improved cognitive function.”).
140. See, e.g., BRIT. MED. ASS’N, THERAPEUTIC USES OF CANNABIS 66 (1997)
[hereinafter BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CANNABIS] (“Impairment of
psychomotor and cognitive performance, especially in complex tasks, has been
shown in normal subjects in many tests. Impairments include slowed reaction
time, short-term memory deficits, impaired attention, time and space distortion,
and impaired coordination. These effects combine with the sedative effects to
cause deleterious effects on driving ability or operation of machinery.” (citations
omitted)); see also, e.g., NAT’L ACAD. REP., supra note 20, at 85–99, 230; NAT’L
INST., Marijuana, supra note 21. See generally Larkin, Reflexive Federalism,
supra note 10.
141. See, e.g., Alejandro Azofeifa et al., Driving Under the Influence of
Marijuana and Illicit Drugs Among Persons Aged ≥16 Years—United States,
2018, MORBID. & MORTAL. WKLY. REP. (Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prev., Atlanta,
Ga.), Dec. 20, 2019, at 1153, 1154 (“In a study of injured drivers aged 16–20 years
evaluated at level 1 trauma centers in Arizona during 2008–2014, 10% of tested
drivers were simultaneously positive for both alcohol and [THC.]” (footnote
omitted)); BECKY BUI & JACK K. REED, COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, DRIVING
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS AND ALCOHOL: A REPORT PURSUANT TO HOUSE
BILL 17-1315 7 (2018) (noting that in 2016 alcohol and THC were the most
common drug combination in cases with test results); DARRIN T. GRONDEL ET AL.,
WASH. TRAFFIC SAFETY COMM’N, MARIJUANA USE, ALCOHOL USE, AND DRIVING IN
WASHINGTON STATE 1-2 (2018) (“Poly-drug drivers (combinations of alcohol and
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other.142 A THC-alcohol cocktail can disable someone from
being able to drive safely even if neither drug alone would do
so.143 Even short-term or occasional cannabis use poses
drugs or multiple drugs) is now the most common type of impairment among
drivers in fatal crashes. . . . The most common substance in poly-drug drivers is
alcohol, followed by THC. . . . Since 2012, the number of poly-drug drivers
involved in fatal crashes [has] increased an average of 15 percent every year . . . .
By 2016, the number of poly-drug drivers [was] more than double the number of
alcohol-only drivers and five times higher than the number of THC-only drivers
involved in fatal crashes.”); 6 ROCKY MTN. HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING
AREA STRATEGIC INTEL. UNIT, THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: THE
IMPACT 10 (2019) (chart depicting that 46% of the drivers who tested positive for
marijuana also had used alcohol and that 40% of marijuana users also used
alcohol and another drug) [hereinafter ROCKY MTN. HIDTA 2019 REPORT];
CAULKINS ET AL., INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 44 (“Marijuana users are much more
likely than are nonusers to drink and to abuse alcohol. For example, current
marijuana users are five times as likely as nonusers to meet DSM-IV criteria for
alcohol abuse or dependence (26 percent versus 5 percent); that is, one in four
current marijuana users is a problem drinker (calculated using 2012 NSDUH
data using the SAMHSA online tool). . . . The national household survey asks
people what, if any, other substances they used the last time they drank alcohol.
Among the 15.4 million people who used both alcohol and marijuana at some time
in the past 30 days, 54 percent reported using marijuana along with alcohol the
last time they drank, a proportion that rises to 83 percent among daily or neardaily marijuana users.” (footnote omitted)); ROBERT L. DUPONT, INST. FOR BEHAV.
& HEALTH, IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE MARIJUANA DUID LAWS TO IMPROVE HIGHWAY
SAFETY (2016). See generally Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 94, at 478–79,
478 nn.104–07. The number of THC and alcohol users noted in studies is likely
low because the police often do not drug test a driver arrested for DUI, since
testing is costly and a positive test result would not increase the punishment.
See, e.g., ROCKY MTN. HIDTA 2019 REPORT, supra, at 14.
142. See, e.g., BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CANNABIS, supra note 140, at 73
(noting the “additive effect” when marijuana and alcohol are combined); IVERSEN,
supra note 17, at 96 (“It may be that the greatest risk of marijuana in this context
is to amplify the impairment caused by alcohol when, as often happens, both
drugs are taken together . . . .”); R. Andrew Sewell et al., The Effect of Cannabis
Compared with Alcohol on Driving, 18 AM. J. ADDICTION 185 (2009). See generally
Larkin, Drugged Driving, supra note 94, at 478–80, 479 nn.105–08 (collecting
authorities).
143. See, e.g., Stanford Chihuri et al., Interaction of Marijuana and Alcohol on
Fatal Motor Vehicle Crash Risk: A Case-Control Study, 4 INJURY EPIDEMIOLOGY 8
(2017); Guohua Li et al., Role of Alcohol and Marijuana Use in the Initiation of
Fatal Two-Vehicle Crashes, 27 ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 342 (2017). But see
Julian Santaella-Tenorio et al., US Traffic Fatalities, 1985-2014, and Their
Relationship to Medical Marijuana Laws, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 336 (2017)
(finding a decrease in traffic fatalities in states with medical marijuana
programs).
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serious societal risks if someone “drives while high,” and it is
likely that someone who is dependent on cannabis will often
do so. For reasons such as these, the federal government has
found that driving under the influence of cannabis is a major
public health problem.144
144. See, e.g., OFF. OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY 23 (2010) (concluding that, because drug-impaired driving poses a
threat to public safety similar to the one resulting from alcohol-impaired driving,
the nation should undertake “a response on a level equivalent to the highly
successful effort to prevent drunk driving”); Drugged Driving, DRUGFACTS (Nat’l
Inst. on Drug Abuse, Bethesda, Md.), Nov. 2013, at 2 (“Considerable evidence
from both real and simulated driving studies indicates that marijuana can
negatively affect a driver’s attentiveness, perception of time and speed, and
ability to draw on information obtained from past experiences.”); see also, e.g., 5
ROCKY MTN. HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA STRATEGIC INTEL. UNIT,
THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: THE IMPACT 5–17 (Supp. 2019);
BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CANNABIS, supra note 140, at 66 (“Impairment of
psychomotor and cognitive performance, especially in complex tasks, has been
shown in normal subjects in many tests. Impairments include slowed reaction
time, short-term memory deficits, impaired attention, time and space distortion,
and impaired coordination. These effects combine with the sedative effects to
cause deleterious effects on driving ability or operation of machinery.” (citations
omitted)); ROOM ET AL., supra note 5, at 18–19 (“Better-controlled epidemiological
studies have recently provided credible evidence that cannabis users who drive
while intoxicated are at increased risk of motor vehicle crashes.”); D. Mark
Anderson et al., Medical Marijuana Laws, Traffic Fatalities, and Alcohol
Consumption, 56 J. L. & ECON. 333 (2013); DuPont et al., in CONTEMPORARY
HEALTH ISSUES ON MARIJUANA, supra note 5, at 186 (“Today there is a wealth of
evidence that marijuana is an impairing substance that affects skills necessary
for safe driving.”); Rebecca L. Hartman & Marilyn A. Huestis, Cannabis Effects
on Driving Skills, 59 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 478 (2013); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The
Problem of “Driving While Stoned” Demands an Aggressive Public Policy
Response, J. DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS, 2018, at 1; Ed Wood, Skydiving Without a
Parachute, 4 J. ADDICTION MED. & THERAPY 1020 (2016). See generally Larkin,
Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 135–37, 135 nn.145–51 (collecting
studies). There are other potential harms from smoking cannabis. For a sample,
see Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 9, at 323–31; Zara Latif & Nadish
Garg, The Impact of Marijuana on the Cardiovascular System: A Review of the
Most Common Cardiovascular Events Associated with Marijuana Use, 9 J.
CLINICAL MED. 1925, 1936 (2020) (“Although it is widely viewed as a safe drug,
marijuana has been strongly linked to various cardiovascular adverse events over
the years. Many cases have linked marijuana to myocardial infarction, especially
in young healthy men with no other risk factors. Marijuana has also been
associated with a worse mortality rate post MI [myocardial infarction, or heart
attack]. Cases of marijuana precipitating arrhythmias, stress cardiomyopathy,
and arteritis have all been described. With the rise in cannabis use among older
patients, who are the most vulnerable to cardiovascular events, it is expected that
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We cannot rely on the market to prevent those problems.
On the contrary, firms in the cannabis industry have every
incentive to see an increase in the number of casual users.145
The incentive is even stronger to create as many heavy users
as possible. As Professor Kleiman cleverly put it, the
cannabis industry is “financially dependent on dependent
consumers.”146 Accordingly, just as the tobacco industry did
for most of the twentieth century, the cannabis industry will
devote its marketing practices toward increasing the number
of heavy, long-term users, because those people are the
primary source of its revenue.147 Increasing the number of
these reports will increase in the next few years.”); Nora D. Volkow, Marijuana
and Medicine: The Need for a Science-Based Approach, in 2 PROFESSIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON ADDICTION MEDICINE 23, 28 (Mark Stanford & Donald Avoy eds.,
2009) (“Marijuana is not a benign drug. It is illegal and has significant adverse
health and social consequences associated with its use.”).
145. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 31 (“‘Drug policy is all about reducing
demand, and a company that has a profit motive is only going to increase
demand,’ [former Marijuana Policy Project lobbyist Don] Riffle said. ‘Having a big
commercial marijuana industry runs counter to public health goals.’”); Kamin,
Legal Cannabis, supra note 16, at 652 (“The downside of a free market model, of
course, is the lack of restraint on the profit motive. In an unregulated market,
there will be no check on the desire of businesses to increase profits at the expense
of customers. The profit motive will drive businesses to develop new products and
cultivate new consumers by targeting new users.”).
146. Kleiman, Cannabis Hash, supra note 93.
147. Id.; see also, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 58 (“Any businessman would want
in on marijuana. It is a legal drug, and a legal drug is a gold mine. If it is
addictive, it creates a compulsion to purchase. As we learned from the tobacco
hearings of the 1990s, not all businessmen can resist exploiting their customers’
compulsions. The National Institute on Drug Abuse says marijuana ‘can’ be
addictive. But even if a drug is merely ‘habit forming,’ as many doctors believe
marijuana to be, it creates an unlevel playing field between seller and consumer.
The more ‘efficient’ the market, the more powerful this inequality. . . . But
corporations bring to the fore questions of size, power and accountability. Do we
want multinational businesses using vast marketing budgets and gifted creative
teams to teach our children that smoking a lot of pot is somehow sexy, or manly,
or sophisticated? Do we want labs to come up with new flavors and varieties that
turn pot-smoking into an adventure in connoisseurship and a way of demarcating
oneself by class? Would we be content with a Microsoft of marijuana?”); Kamin,
Legal Cannabis, supra note 16, at 652 (“[A]s with the tobacco and alcohol
industries, there is reason to be concerned that a commercial marijuana industry
will seek to profit from the heavy users who account for the overwhelming
majority of marijuana consumed.”).
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cannabis-dependent people, however, is not a sensible public
health approach to cannabis legalization. In fact, it is
difficult to find a public policy field where addiction is
regarded as a social benefit.148
Traditional forms of regulation, like the ones used in
Colorado and elsewhere, do not address those problems.149
Rules governing a product’s price and quality are designed to
protect consumers against monopoly pricing and unsafe
goods. Those rules do not address improvident decisions by
users and externalities imposed on unwilling third parties.
The rules assume that consumers can make sensible choices
and leave to them the responsibility to decide whether a
particular widget will generate more benefits than harms.
They also operate against the background assumption that
the tort system will provide a remedy for any injuries caused
to third parties in an efficient manner. Those assumptions,
however, are misplaced when the product is both addictive
and potentially harmful to users and others. Persons who
become addicted to a substance have lost most, if not all, of
their ability to make a rational choice whether to consume it.
That loss, after all, is a defining feature of an addiction.150

148. See Bonnie, supra note 16, at 591 (“While caution is indicated, legalizing
states are ignoring the lessons of history by creating a commercial market with
vested interests in promoting increased consumption and aggressive advertising
that inevitably encourages youthful use. This is the wrong path. A cautious
approach would gradually open the regulatory spigot while carefully monitoring
the consequences of doing so. Proper public health surveillance mechanisms must
be in place from the beginning so that the effects of different regulatory choices
can be measured.”).
149. See Kamin, Colorado’s Regulation, supra note 109, at 226 (describing
Colorado’s regulatory approach as “a market-based licensing scheme that has
served as a model for other states and nations around the world.”); id. at 226–27
(“While other states have capped either the number of marijuana businesses that
will be authorized or the total amount of marijuana they will be permitted to
produce, Colorado did neither. Rather, it created a compulsory licensing and
tiered-production system that would allow supply and demand to determine how
much marijuana would be produced by how many entities.” (footnotes omitted)).
150. See ERICKSON, supra note 112, at 28–32 (“Chemical dependence is
compulsive, pathological, impaired control over drug use, leading to an inability
to stop using drugs in spite of adverse consequences.”).
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Moreover, users can decide whether to drive after smoking
marijuana, but no one can make that decision for someone
else. Every day during rush hour we see proof of the
proposition that “No man is an island.” John Stuart Mill did
not live in the age of motor vehicles, so his libertarian
philosophy does not make sense in a world where they have
become a necessity despite their potential to maim or kill—
and that happens all too often when a driver is under the
influence of an impairing drug like THC.
*****
The result is this: Cannabis is not an unadulterated
good. Heavy, long-term, and widespread cannabis use has
the potential to exceed any potential benefits that its
euphoria-inducing cannabinoid might have. Most regulatory
restrictions do not directly address those problems. Yet,
there are two other forms of supply-side regulation that
might: state ownership of wholesale or retail cannabis
distribution facilities and advertising bans. The next section
discusses their utility.
2. A Response: State Ownership of Retail Cannabis
Stores
One alternative to large-scale commercialization would
be to permit only individuals to grow and possess a limited
amount of marijuana for personal use. Vermont uses that
system. That option might work in largely rural areas, like
Montana, but would not in large cities, such as Chicago, or
in their components, such as Queens, New York City, where
there are no large unoccupied areas open for agricultural
use. Some other cultivation and distribution system would be
necessary there.
Another approach would be to limit wholesale or retail
sales to not-for-profit organizations. Professor Caulkins has
endorsed that option.151 It has the advantage of using for
151. See Caulkins, Marijuana Dangers, supra note 16, at 33 (“There are many
ways of putting that [harm-avoidance or -reduction] philosophy into practice. One
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distribution organizations that do not have profit
maximization as their raison d’être. That reduces the risk
that the competitive spirit of their owners and operators will
seek to addict as many people as possible by persuading nonusers to become occasional users and occasional users to
become heavy users.152 Unfortunately, however, not-forprofit entities might not enforce restraints on sales to minors
as strictly as the state might desire, because of the lost
revenue involved in rigorous enforcement. Moreover, as
discussed below, a state should ban cannabis advertising by
wholesale or retail stores to reduce purchases, but a state
might not be able to prevent a private enterprise, whether
for-profit or not-for-profit, from advertising the sale of
cannabis, given the First Amendment Free Speech Clause
issues that any advertising ban would raise.153
A third option, as a 2015 RAND Corporation report has
identified, is to restrict distribution to state-owned cannabis
stores.154 The Twenty-First Amendment gives states that
way is to start by restricting production and distribution to non-profits or forbenefit corporations whose charters mandate that they merely meet existing
demand, not pursue unfettered market growth to maximize shareholders’ returns
and owners’ wealth. It would also be wise to require these organizations’ boards
to be dominated by public health and child-welfare advocates.”).
152. Placing regulatory responsibility in the hands of public health agencies
rather than state revenue departments would also help avoid encouraging
overuse as a revenue-generating opportunity.
153. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (holding
unconstitutional a federal law prohibiting the advertising of certain compounded
drugs); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (holding
unconstitutional state restrictions on the advertising of cigars and smokeless
tobacco); Greater New Orleans Broadcast. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173
(1999) (holding unconstitutional a federal ban on casino gambling in a state
where it was a lawful activity); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484
(1996) (holding unconstitutional a state ban on accurate information about the
retail prices of alcoholic beverages); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476
(1995) (holding unconstitutional a federal ban on the alcoholic content of
beverages); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Regulating Marijuana Advertising and
Marketing to Promote Public Health: Navigating the Constitutional Minefield, 21
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1081 (2017).
154. See CAULKINS ET AL., INSIGHT, supra note 92, at 60–64; see also Unlocked
Potential: Small Businesses in the Cannabis Industry, Hearing Before the House
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authority to control the distribution of alcohol within their
jurisdictions.155 Exercising that authority, states regulate
the sale of wine, beer, and distilled spirits in numerous
ways.156 For example, some states allow only wine and beer
to be sold at grocery or convenience stores, with the sale of
distilled spirits limited to separate liquor stores. Some states
prohibit the sale of alcohol on Sunday. More than a dozen
states, however, have decided to own and operate or contract
the wholesale or retail distribution facilities for alcohol.157
Small Business Committee, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Paul J. Larkin, Jr.,
recommending state ownership). That would include in-state brick-and-mortar
stores, online stores, and delivery services (e.g., a Grubhub for marijuana).
Additional options that are a variant of the three mentioned above include (1)
limiting distribution to members of small co-operatives or buyers’ clubs; (2)
permitting locally controlled retail sales without legalizing large-scale
commercial production (the “Dutch coffee-shop model”); and (3) having very few
closely monitored for-profit licensees. Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Options and
Issues Regarding Marijuana Legalization, PERSP. (RAND Corp., Santa Monica,
Cal.), 2015, at 1, 4.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”).
156. See, e.g., Paul Byrne & Dmitri Nizovtsev, Exploring the Effects of State
Differences in Alcohol Retain Restrictions, 50 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 15, 16 (2017)
(“States currently regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages under two general
systems: a control system or a licensure system. Generally, when a state directly
controls the pricing of some types of alcoholic beverages—through operating state
stores, regulating agency stores, or directly setting the retail price—such a state
is considered a ‘control’ or ‘monopoly’ state. When a state government indirectly
controls the sale and distribution of alcohol through licensing of privately owned
establishments, it is considered a ‘licensure’ or ‘privatized’ state. Currently in the
United States most states operate under a licensure system. However, 18 states
maintain some direct control over certain sectors of the alcoholic beverage
market. . . . Among the licensure states, retail restrictions also vary significantly.
Some states have few restrictions whereas others have restrictions on the days
and hours of alcohol sales or the type of establishments through which alcohol
can be sold to consumers. In the most restrictive states, all alcoholic beverages
must be sold at licensed retail liquor stores. There are also states in which such
limitations apply to stronger alcoholic beverages whereas beverages with lower
alcohol content can be sold at a wide range of establishments. The line between
the beverage groups can differ by state but in all cases restrictions (or absence
thereof) are tied to the alcohol content.”).
157. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 28-3-1 to 28-3-75 (2020); Idaho Liquor Act, IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 23-101 to 23-312 (West 2020); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 123.1 to 123.37
(West 2020); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, §§ 451-461 (West 2020); MICH.
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Some own the facilities or contract them out only for distilled
spirits or for alcohol above a certain potency. Other states
have different approaches for wholesale and retail sales
(New Hampshire) or have different systems in different
counties (Maryland).
States should adopt a state ownership model as part of
any legalization program. Limiting distribution to state
businesses carries a lower risk of overall societal harm. If the
demand for cannabis resembles the demand for alcohol or
tobacco—remember: alcohol, nicotine, and THC are all
potentially addictive substances—there will always be a
demand for that product. If the marijuana industry grows in
the same way that the tobacco industry did, over time a small
number of very large companies will distribute the vast
majority of the product.158 The new industry is likely to
generate substantial profits, which would translate into
enormous political power.159 Once it has secured the
legalized commerce of marijuana, the industry would fight
tooth-and-nail to maintain its profits and influence. Witness
how the tobacco industry fought regulation of tobacco by the
Food and Drug Administration for decades. Allowing
CONST. art. IV, § 40 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2020 amendments); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 436.1204 to 436.1205, 436.1209, 436.1211 (West 2020); MISS.
CODE ANN. §§ 67-1-3, 67-1-5(i), (j) (West 2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-100 (West
2020) (defining “Alcohol,” “Alcoholic beverages,” “Beer,” “Spirits,” and “Wine”); id.
§ 4.1-101 (creating the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Authority); id. § 4.1103 (empowering the Board of Directors of the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage
Control Authority to sell distilled spirits). See generally Control State Directory
and
Info,
NAT’L
ALCOHOLIC
BEVERAGE
CONTROL
ASS’N,
https://www.nabca.org/control-state-directory-and-info (last visited Mar. 16,
2021).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 58 and 67–71.
159. See Kleiman, Cannabis Hash, supra note 93 (recommending state
ownership as one option: “As more and more states begin to legalize marijuana
over the next few years, the cannabis industry will begin to get richer—and that
means it will start to wield considerably more political power, not only over the
states but over national policy, too. That’s how we could get locked into a bad
system in which the primary downside of legalizing pot—increased drug abuse,
especially by minors—will be greater than it needs to be, and the benefits,
including tax revenues, smaller than they could be.”); Larkin, Gummy Bears,
supra note 9, at 355–56, 355 nn.99–100.
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nationwide commercialization of marijuana might generate
considerable harms but prove to be politically irreversible.
We generally do not approve, let alone applaud, policies
or practices that worsen the lives of a large percentage of the
people who undertake them. Few members of Congress
would be willing to appear at a town hall meeting and tell
their constituents that, if cannabis is legalized, one of every
ten will use marijuana on a regular basis and that one of
every ten children who start using it as adolescents will
become addicted or suffer some form of mental illness.160
Nonetheless, if Congress were to legalize marijuana use in
one way or another—for example, by deleting it from the CSA
generally or in those states that permit it to be used
recreationally—Congress would need to decide if marijuana
should be treated in the same manner as other consumer
goods.161
It might seem odd for a state to consider turning its back
on private ownership of any commodity. Since our colonial
period, the nation has had a capitalist economy that
protected the right to own and operate the machinery of
commerce.162 Yet, the nation has never been committed to a
purely laissez-faire approach to economic governance.163 As
noted above, governments have traditionally justified
legislative interference in commerce on the ground that
160. See Larkin, Gummy Bears, supra note 9, at 326–31, 326 nn.30–40.
161. Removing cannabis from Schedule I of the CSA, or deleting it from the
CSA entirely, would not eliminate all federal regulation of THC. THC is a drug
and therefore would remain subject to regulation by the FDA under the FDCA.
See Larkin, Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 115–27; Sean M.
O’Connor & Erika Lietzan, The Surprising Reach of FDA Regulation of Cannabis,
Even After Descheduling, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 823 (2019); Patricia J. Zettler,
Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845 (2017).
162. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE NEW ENGLAND MERCHANTS IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1955); JOHN J. MCCUSKER & RUSSELL R. MENARD, THE
ECONOMY OF BRITISH AMERICA, 1607-1789 (1985); EDWIN J. PERKINS, THE
ECONOMY OF COLONIAL AMERICA (2d ed. 1988). See generally Larkin, Property,
supra note 86, at 4–6, 21–54 (describing the understanding of “property” held by
the Colonists and Framers).
163. See, e.g., BOURGIN, supra note 86.
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market
defects—such
as
natural
monopolies
or
externalities—justify regulation. In those circumstances,
governments establish administrative agencies to regulate a
good or service rather than leave it to the market or tort
system.164
A state-run system has several additional advantages
over a for-profit or not-for-profit system. State ownership of
distribution stores would make it easier for a state to monitor
marijuana sales (and employees) to prevent unauthorized
distribution to minors and to the black market165 (which has
not disappeared166). State ownership would help avoid the
164. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2084
(establishing the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission and empowering it
to create safety standards and initiate recalls of products that present an
unreasonable risk of injury or death); DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF,
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (global ed., 4th ed. 2015).
165. See Bonnie, supra note 16, at 591–92 (“States would be well-advised to
think about alternatives to a commercialized marijuana market while they still
have that opportunity. . . . In short, if we are going to legalize, it needs to be done
in a way that protects the public health. The right starting point is not the alcohol
model. It is a non-commercialized ‘containment’ model.”); Benjamin M. Leff, Tax
Benefits of Government-Owned Marijuana Stores, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659, 683
(2016) (“Local governments may be in a better position than for-profit sellers to
operate marijuana stores consistent with the public welfare, and several
commentators, including some participants in this symposium, have advocated
that at least some states should experiment with a government monopoly on
marijuana sales.” (footnote omitted)).
166. See John Schroyer, California Marijuana Notebook: How Illicit Market
Competition, Industry Divisiveness Hound the State’s Legal Cannabis Market,
MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Feb. 20, 2020), https://mjbizdaily.com/californiamarijuana-notebook-how-illicit-market-competition-industry-divisivenesshound-the-states-legal-cannabis-market/ (“It’s an open secret in the California
marijuana industry that since the state launched licensed adult-use sales in
2018, many – if not most – legal operators have done business illegally to some
degree. And that’s still the case, according to Chris Coulombe, CEO of Sonomabased distributor Pacific Expeditors. ‘I have to imagine that 60% of the market
overall is probably playing in parallel markets, but I don’t think they enjoy that.
It’s truly a decision of necessity,’ Coulombe told Marijuana Business Daily. ‘You
have a lot of retailers that are selling knockoff products . . . and you have
cultivators that are selling product out the backdoor so they can keep their
business alive.’ As one source told MJBizDaily in early 2019: ‘Anybody who’s
profitable still has at least one foot in the black market.’”); ARCVIEW MARKET
RSCH. & BDS ANALYTICS, CALIFORNIA: THE WORLD’S LARGEST CANNABIS MARKET
7-8, 10 (2019) (“A unique feature of the California market that contributed to
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problems that arise whenever the law permits only one
business form—such as not-for-profit concerns—to
participate in an activity, even though the members of the
industry prefer other forms—such as for-profit companies.
Corporation law is largely within the bailiwick of the states
to devise,167 and there is a risk that particular states might
bend their laws to enable (if not encourage) parties to obscure
the true ownership of a not-for-profit enterprise. That risk
might be slight, but there is far less risk of such legal
chicanery if the state itself must own the cannabis
distribution business.168
these dives in topline sales figures is the robust competition from the illicit
market with which licensed retailers are forced to contend. Given the state’s
lengthy history as the source for the bulk of the nation’s illicit cannabis, and the
fact that many producers and retailers opted not to enter the regulated market
due to compliance costs, Californian consumers have no shortage of cheap illicit
sources for their cannabis. They rushed into dispensaries amid the hoopla of longawaited legalization and then quietly returned to traditional sources when they
saw after-tax prices reflective of the 77% tax-and-regulatory load the legal
market bears. . . . In an $11.3 billion total cannabis market of 2017, $8.3 billion
was already being spent in extra-legal channels. For the first time anywhere,
adult use legalization actually prompted growth in illicit sales in California in
2018.”); Brooke Staggs, Legal? Illegal? Some Players Still Work Both Sides of State Marijuana
Industry,
ORANGE
CNTY.
REG.
(Mar.
15,
2019,
6:00
AM),
https://www.ocregister.com/2019/03/15/legal-illegal-some-players-still-workboth-sides-of-state-marijuana-industry/ (“The state’s illicit market—which has its
roots in the medical marijuana market California created 21 years ago—is thriving,
more profitable and roughly eight times bigger than the legal world.”).
167. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. FDIC, 140 S. Ct. 713, 718 (2020) (“Corporations are
generally ‘creatures of state law,’ and state law is well equipped to handle
disputes involving corporate property rights.” (citation omitted) (quoting Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975))); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 83–89
(1994).
168. State ownership also might not have the same banking problems that forprofit and not-for-profit business would have with using the national banking
system for receipts from the sale of marijuana. Banks that accept deposits from
businesses selling marijuana in violation of the CSA would violate the federal
money laundering statutes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957. States that have the
same structure as the federal government—that is, states that have a stateowned and -operated treasury—can deposit the proceeds into its treasury rather
than use the interstate banking system. That might avoid the need for Congress
to revise the banking laws to address the problems resulting from the operation
of a large-scale cash business. The fewer statutes modified, the lesser the risk of
unintended statutory consequences.
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A second restriction is an advertising ban. Every
legitimate business engages in price and quality advertising
to persuade consumers that its product costs less and
delivers more than its competitors.169 Companies in the
cannabis industry generally do not. The U.S. Postal Service
will not deliver marijuana ads, and the Federal
Communications Commission has not approved radio or
television advertising over the federally regulated
airwaves.170 The major social media opportunities are also
unavailable because (at present) Facebook, Twitter, and
Instagram will not accept cannabis advertisements.171 State
laws vary as to whether medical or recreational cannabis
businesses can advertise. Some states prohibit advertising
altogether. Others, such as Colorado, treat cannabis
advertising like alcohol advertising. A third group, like New
Mexico, has no rules on the subject.172 If cannabis retailing
were left to private ownership, the cannabis industry would
no doubt pressure the government (and major media
companies) to lift any ban on advertising, and more
advertising would mean more dependency. A state monopoly,
by contrast, could easily maintain a ban on advertising.
May a state monopolize the retail distribution of
cannabis? Yes. No one has a constitutional right to distribute

169. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 557 (2001) (“[W]e
have acknowledged the theory that product advertising stimulates demand for
products, while suppressed advertising may have the opposite effect.”); 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495–96 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(“Advertising has been a part of our culture throughout our history. Even in
colonial days, the public relied on ‘commercial speech’ for vital information about
the market. Early newspapers displayed advertisements for goods and services
on their front pages, and town criers called out prices in public squares. Indeed,
commercial messages played such a central role in public life prior to the founding
that Benjamin Franklin authored his early defense of a free press in support of
his decision to print, of all things, an advertisement for voyages to Barbados.”
(citations omitted)); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557, 567–68 (1980).
170. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 66.
171. See, e.g., id. at 67.
172. See, e.g., id. at 66–67.
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or possess marijuana,173 and the CSA does not prohibit the
states from changing their penal codes to legalize it for
medical or recreational use.174 Accordingly, a state can
choose to treat cannabis as contraband or allow it to be sold
and owned but regulated.175 A state limitation on entry into
a market is a form of regulation, even if the state grants itself
the monopoly. In fact, numerous states use their TwentyFirst Amendment authority over alcohol distribution by
owning or contracting out the retail sale of one or more types
of intoxicating beverages.176 The reach of a state’s inherent
police power over marijuana is at least as broad as its power
173. For examples of cases rejecting various claims that the federal or state
bans on marijuana distribution or possession are unconstitutional see United
States v. Fogarty, 692 F.2d 542, 547–48 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Kiffer,
477 F.2d 349, 352–57 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Rodriguez-Camacho, 468
F.2d 1220, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Scales, 464 F.2d 371, 373–
76 (6th Cir. 1972); State v. Kells, 259 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Neb. 1977); State v. Leins,
234 N.W.2d 645, 645–48 (Iowa 1975); State v. Donovan, 344 A.2d 401, 405–06
(Me. 1975); Blincoe v. State, 204 S.E.2d 597, 599 (Ga. 1974); State v. Tabory, 196
S.E.2d 111, 112–14 (S.C. 1973); State v. Parker, 256 A.2d 159 (N.H. 1969);
Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898 (Mass. 1969); People v. Stark, 400 P.2d
923 (Colo. 1965). See also, e.g., Larkin, Reflexive Federalism, supra note 10
(manuscript at 3, 3 n.17); cf. Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304 (1917) (ruling that
there is no federal constitutional right to possess or use alcohol). The Supreme
Court has not squarely addressed the issue, but its decisions in related cases
make the point. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587–
94 (1979) (rejecting an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a city policy refusing
to hire methadone users); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979)
(rejecting the argument that there is an express or implied exception to the FDCA
for drugs that can be used to treat the terminally ill); cf. Marshall v. United
States, 414 U.S. 417, 422–30 (1974) (rejecting due process and equal protection
challenges to Title II of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251–
55, which excludes repeat offenders from discretionary rehabilitative addiction
treatment in lieu of incarceration).
174. See Larkin, Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 110–11.
175. The principal federal statute protecting the economic benefits of a free
market and interstate commerce—the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq.—permits the states to decide whether to adopt a laissez-faire approach to
their local economies or regulate the cultivation and distribution of plants like
cannabis. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (“We find
nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that
its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed
by its legislature.”).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 130–33.
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under the Twenty-First Amendment to regulate alcohol.177
Accordingly, a state clearly can monopolize the sale of
cannabis.
The next question logically follows from that one. Having
legislated itself a monopoly over cannabis distribution, may
a state decline to advertise its new consumer product? The
answer again is, yes. Neither the Constitution nor any act of
Congress requires any market participant, including a
monopolist, to advertise its wares. On the contrary, a number
of Supreme Court cases have placed restrictions on what
speech the government may demand someone utter.178 To be
sure, a state is not a “person” for constitutional purposes and
therefore does not possess First Amendment free speech
rights.179 Nonetheless, a state, like any other market
participant, can decide not to advertise marijuana or any
other item it sells. Moreover, a government, like a person,
can decide what message to endorse or reject.180 That

177. Compare, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905)
(“According to settled principles, the police power of a State must be held to
embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative
enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”), with, e.g.,
Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2462–76 (2019)
(describing a state’s Twenty-First Amendment regulatory authority).
178. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986)
(ruling that the state cannot require a regulated energy utility to place a thirdparty’s newsletter discussing electric power conservation in its billing envelopes);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–17 (1977) (ruling that New Hampshire
cannot force drivers to display the state’s motto of “Live Free or Die” on stateowned motor vehicle license plates).
179. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24 (1966) (“The
word ‘person’ in the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be expanded to encompass the
States of the Union, and to our knowledge this has never been done by any
court.”).
180. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200,
207 (2015) (“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause
from determining the content of what it says.”); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009) (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government
regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”); Johanns
v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (“[T]he Government’s own
speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”); Bd. of Regents v.

2021]

CANNABIS CAPITALISM

279

decision is certainly a sensible one in the case of goods like
tobacco, alcohol, or cannabis, for the reasons given above. If
a state had to justify its decision, it could readily do so by
arguing that its refusal to advertise might help prevent
overuse of cannabis and reduce dependence and roadway
crashes.181
III. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
However a state chooses to regulate the cannabis
industry, the conflict between state and federal law will
remain unchanged unless and until Congress decides to
revise the CSA or directs the Executive Branch to enforce it
as it is currently written. There is a possibility, however, that
Congress could decide to lift the CSA’s ban in states that
have legalized cannabis for medical or recreational use.182
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (a government entity has the right to
“speak for itself.”); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is the very business of government to favor and
disfavor points of view . . . .”); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (observing that a government entity “is entitled to
say what it wishes”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991); Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 n.7 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (“Government is not restrained by the First Amendment from
controlling its own expression.”).
181. See Bonnie, supra note 16, at 593 (“If the legislature’s objective in
repealing prohibition is to set up a regulatory policy that allows recreational use
(or medical use for that matter) while seeking to contain it, then it would be
illogical to permit private sellers to promote and encourage consumption. In my
opinion, once commercialization is permitted, the public health costs will be
difficult to contain. As already indicated, I believe that Washington and Colorado
are making a huge mistake by starting with a private commercial model for
cultivation and distribution. In my opinion, legislatures legalizing recreational
use of marijuana should declare explicitly that the ultimate regulatory objective
is to protect the public health, not to facilitate commerce in cannabis products (or
to serve the economic interests of suppliers and retailers). Legalization should be
designed to accommodate liberty, not to celebrate it. The policy aim should not be
to promote or facilitate marijuana use (or even ‘responsible use’), but rather to
manage lawful commerce in marijuana in a way that protects the public health.”).
182. I have argued elsewhere that, if Congress decides to revisit the CSA, it
should make clear that the Food and Drug Administration is responsible for
regulating botanical cannabis and any cannabinoids derived from it, regardless
of whether and how the states permit marijuana to be used for medical purposes.
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Members of Congress have introduced bills to achieve that
result by amending the CSA or limiting the use of federal
funds to enforce it.183 Congress, however, has not yet passed
any of them.
That impasse raises the final issue. Suppose Congress
decides that a state retail-store ownership requirement and
an advertising ban are sensible ways to accommodate a
state’s desire to allow the sale of marijuana while also
reducing cannabis dependency and promoting roadway
safety. That is, imagine that Congress concludes that
requiring the states to take those two steps is a reasonable
compromise between the desire of some parties to see the
issue of marijuana legalization altogether left to the states
and the hope of other parties that Congress will direct the
Executive Branch to enforce the CSA as written. If so, may
Congress require a state to adopt one or both of those
regulatory tools as a condition of exempting the state’s
legalization program from the CSA? Does Congress have the
constitutional authority to demand that a state accept those
conditions to allow cannabis to be sold under whatever other
rules it cares to impose?
This scenario is a novel one. There is no precedent
squarely on point, so resort to first principles is necessary.
Some (if not all) states will certainly object to any such
requirements on the ground that they trespass on state
sovereignty, in violation of the Tenth Amendment.184 The
state’s argument would go as follows:
First, a state retail store-ownership requirement would
See Larkin, Reflexive Federalism, supra note 10 (manuscript at 25–30); Larkin,
Reconsidering Marijuana, supra note 10, at 115–27.
183. See, e.g., Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting
States Act, H.R. 2093, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019) (permitting the states to
decide whether to legalize marijuana); State Cannabis Commerce Act, S. 2030,
116th Cong. (2019) (preventing federal funds from being used to prevent the
states from implementing cannabis legalization programs).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”).
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intrude on a state’s authority to define its internal
governmental structure. The Constitution divides the federal
government into three branches, but that framework, and its
underlying separation-of-powers principles, does not apply to
the states.185 Each state enjoys the prerogative to define and
structure its government in any way it sees fit as long as it
retains a “Republican Form of Government,”186 which is no
more threatened by allowing private enterprise to operate
retail cannabis stores than by permitting private ownership
of retail liquor stores.187 However much Congress might
desire to reduce cannabis dependence and impairment, and
however great those harms might be in a particular
jurisdiction, Congress can no more demand that a state take
ownership of marijuana than it can direct the states to take
possession of radioactive waste, which the Supreme Court
held in New York v. United States that Congress cannot do.188
However much Congress might want the states to decide
when, where, and how cannabis sales will be made, and
however often private parties might be willing to look the
other way when (for instance) a minor tries to purchase
marijuana, Congress can no more impress state employees

185. See, for example, Mayor of Philadelphia v. Education Equality League,
415 U.S. 605, 615 (1974), Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608,
612 (1937), and Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902), all ruling that federal
separation of powers principles do not bind the states. See also Highland Farms,
300 U.S. at 612 (“How power shall be distributed by a state among its
governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a question for the state itself.”);
Dreyer, 187 U.S. at 84 (“Whether the legislative, executive, and judicial powers
of a state shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or
collections of persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some
matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of
government, is for the determination of the state.”); cf. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221
U.S. 559 (1911) (ruling that Congress cannot prohibit a state from moving the
location of its capital as a condition of approving its entry into the union).
186. See U.S. CONST. art. IV (“The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
187. See Highland Farms, 300 U.S. at 612 (ruling that a state law delegating
minimum price-setting authority to private parties does not violate the Guaranty
Clause).
188. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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into that retail identification task than it could force state
law enforcement officers to conduct firearms background
checks, which the Court ruled in Printz v. United States that
Congress also cannot do.189 To paraphrase Chief Justice
Warren Burger’s opinion for the Supreme Court in INS v.
Chadha, the fact that a congressionally required state
cannabis retail-operation requirement is efficient,
convenient, and useful in forestalling cannabis dependence
or motor vehicle crashes, standing alone, will not save that
law if it is contrary to the Constitution.190
Second, an ownership requirement and advertising ban
requirement impermissibly directs the state to adopt
legislation that the state would prefer not to see become
law.191 Congress has the power to pass legislation regulating
interstate and intrastate commerce,192 along with the
authority to create federal agencies to implement those
laws.193 Congress cannot, however, direct states to adopt
state law or to create their own administrative agencies.
Accordingly, the Tenth Amendment forbids Congress from
putting the states to the choice between continued
189. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
190. 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). It is beyond the scope of this Article to decide
whether only a state can make that argument or an entrepreneur can also do so.
See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011) (ruling that, in a criminal
prosecution, the defendant has standing to claim that the statute underlying the
charge violates the Tenth Amendment).
191. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018)
(applying the Anticommandeering Doctrine to hold that Congress cannot forbid
a state from changing state law); New York, 505 U.S. at 155–69, 174–83 (ruling
that Congress cannot force the states to accept either possession of radioactive
waste or whatever rules the federal government adopts for its management).
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.”).
193. The Constitution contemplates that Congress will create “executive
Departments” filled by “Officers of the United States” who will assist the
President with “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST.
art. II, §§ 2-3. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has the
authority to create an administrative state to assist the President perform his
responsibilities. See infra note 196.
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application of the CSA as it stands today and adopting the
requirements as the price for an exemption.
The states’ argument is a reasonable one, but the
response to it is compelling. The reason is that Congress has
the authority to negotiate a “deal” with the states in which
they agree to perform responsibilities that they would
otherwise be free to decline. In that regard, Congress can
condition the states’ receipt of federal benefits on their
willingness to “cooperate” with the federal government to
achieve a legitimate goal that is beyond Congress’s direct
regulatory authority. In other words, Congress may put the
states to the choice described above under its Spending
Clause authority, even if not under its Commerce Clause
power.
Start by considering the latter. Congress lacks the
inherent “police power” that states enjoy,194 but the
Commerce Clause,195 buttressed by the Necessary and
Proper Clause,196 authorizes Congress to regulate inter- and
194. Compare, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905) (“The
authority of the state to enact this statute [viz., a smallpox vaccination
requirement] is to be referred to what is commonly called the police power—a
power which the state did not surrender when becoming a member of the Union
under the Constitution. . . . According to settled principles, the police power of a
state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established
directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public
safety.”), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1924), with, e.g.,
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (“The Constitution . . .
withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power . . . .”) and McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 317, 405 (“Th[e] [federal] government is
acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.”).
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.”).
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”); see,
e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133-35 (2010); McCulloch, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) at 421 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
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intrastate commerce in several ways.197 As relevant here,
Congress may prohibit anyone from using the facilities of
interstate commerce, including the interstate highway and
the national banking systems,198 for the cultivation or
distribution of cannabis. Congress may also prohibit the
purely intrastate growth or sale of marijuana to prevent any
spillover into interstate commerce. The Supreme Court
expressly so held in Gonzales v. Raich,199 and it also rejected
the argument that Congress cannot rely on the Commerce
Clause to regulate the intrastate cannabis market if a state
has its own regulatory program.200
Occasionally, Congress’s exercise of its regulatory
authority butts up against state preferences. When that
happens, the states claim that the Tenth Amendment
entitles them to go their own way. For the last 150 years, the
Supreme Court has followed an erratic trajectory on the
appropriate place of the states and role for the Tenth
Amendment in constitutional law.201 On three recent
constitution, are constitutional.”).
197. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 548-58 (2012)
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 653–60 (opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas &
Alito, JJ., dissenting); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607–19 (2000);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–68 (1995); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Congress
may regulate the “channels” and “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce, as
well as the goods transiting them, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59, including items
that Congress believes are dangerous or “immoral.” See, e.g., Hoke v. United
States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (regarding prostitution); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (regarding impure food and drugs); Champion v. Ames
(The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1901) (regarding lottery tickets and prize lists).
Congress’s regulatory authority also reaches entirely intrastate activities that,
considered individually or as a class, have “a substantial relation to” or
“substantially affect” interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559; see also, e.g.,
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609–13; Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37.
198. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) (upholding Congress’s authority to
create a national bank).
199. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
200. Id. at 26–33.
201. Late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth centuries, the Court
waxed eloquently regarding “the necessary existence” of the states, Lane Cnty. v.
Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868), preserving the states’ “separate and

2021]

CANNABIS CAPITALISM

285

occasions, however, the Court has treated the Tenth
Amendment as a substantive constraint on Congress’s
legislative powers. It is worth analyzing those decisions.
The first case was New York v. United States. It held
unconstitutional a provision in the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 that directed the state
legislative or executive branch to assume title to radioactive
waste or dispose of it as directed by the federal

independent autonomy,” Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868), and protecting
the states’ “indispensable” powers and “essential function[s],” Lane Cnty., 74 U.S.
at 76; see also Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (ruling that Congress
cannot prohibit a state from moving the location of its capital as a condition of
approving its entry into the union); id. at 565 (“The power to locate its own seat
of government and to determine when and how it shall be changed from one place
to another, and to appropriate its own public funds for that purpose, are
essentially and peculiarly state powers. That one of the original thirteen States
could now be shorn of such powers by an act of Congress would not be for a
moment entertained.”). Beginning in the 1930s, however, the states and the
Tenth Amendment waned in importance. The amendment reached its nadir in
1941 in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). In the course of upholding
the constitutionality of a federal minimum wage law over a Tenth Amendment
challenge, the Court gave the back of the hand to the notion that the amendment
played any role in constitutional law. “The amendment states but a truism,” the
Court wrote, “that all is retained which has not been surrendered.” Id. at 124.
The amendment appeared to stage a comeback in 1976 when, in National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court held unconstitutional a federal
law extending minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all state
and local employees. The Court reasoned that states enjoy certain “attribute[s] of
sovereignty” that Congress cannot shear away and are constitutionally entitled
to independence from congressional directives regarding any “functions essential
to [their] separate and independent existence.” Id. at 845 (quoting Coyle, 221 U.S.
at 580). That resurgence was short-lived, however, because only nine years later
the Court overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Since the Garcia case, the
Court has principally used the Tenth Amendment (and its sibling, the Eleventh
Amendment) as a rule of construction, demanding that Congress legislate with
specificity before the Court will conclude that an act of Congress applies to the
states or their operations. In numerous cases raising Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment issues, the Court has adopted a “plain statement” rule, requiring
Congress to specify clearly if a statute applies to the states. See, e.g., Sheriff v.
Gillie, 136 S. Ct. 1594, 1602 (2016); Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S.
125, 140–41 (2004); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73–74 (2000);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–64 (1991); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S.
223, 228, (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).

286

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

government.202 The Court reasoned that the Tenth
Amendment prohibits Congress from treating states like
federal administrative agencies.203 In Printz v. United States,
the Court held unconstitutional a provision in the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act directing state and local
law enforcement officers to implement the act’s background
check provisions.204 That directive, the Court found, was
tantamount to the impermissible “conscripting” or
“commandeering” of state officers.205 Finally, in Murphy v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association the Court concluded
that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act206
unconstitutionally prohibited the states from revising their
own laws outlawing sports gambling.207 Those three cases
have given rise to the so-called Anticommandeering
Doctrine, which would serve as the basis of a state Tenth
Amendment challenge to imposition of state retailownership and advertising-ban requirements as a condition
of modifying the CSA.208
Yet, even when Congress cannot invoke the Commerce
Clause to order the states to undertake certain obligations—
such as setting a minimum driving age or defining a
particular blood-alcohol content to establish impairment as
a matter of law—Congress instead can rely on its
appropriations authority under the Spending Clause to
persuade the states to join in a cooperative federal-state
program by offering them something in return for their
participation. Congress has the Article I authority to raise

202. Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1985).
203. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-69, 174–83 (1992).
204. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
205. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997); see also id. at 904–35.
206. Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106 Stat. 4228 (1992).
207. 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018).
208. I have argued elsewhere that the Anticommandeering Doctrine is illconceived. See Larkin, Reflexive Federalism, supra note 10. For present purposes,
that argument is immaterial.
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taxes and spend federal funds,209 and it can use that power
to underwrite collaborative programs.210 Historically, those
programs have involved an exchange of federal funds for the
states’ willingness to undertake some particular regulatory
task, such as administering a state-managed health care
system for the elderly or poor. A state will receive the funds
only if it agrees to perform whatever tasks Congress would
like to see implemented. The Supreme Court has placed only
a limited number of requirements on Congress’s ability to
place conditions on the receipt of federal funds. Any
conditions must be for the purpose of improving the general
welfare, they must be clear and unambiguous, they must be
reasonably related to the purpose of the federal expenditure,
they must be otherwise constitutional, and they cannot
retroactively nullify already earned benefits.211 Call that
doctrine “cooperative federalism,” “bribery,” the “Golden
Rule” (viz., whoever has the gold makes the rules), or
something else, well-settled Supreme Court case law
recognizes that Congress may buy cooperation from a state
when it cannot demand it.
That rationale applies here. Lifting the CSA ban on
cannabis trafficking benefits the state—and its residents and
businesses—in several ways. Once the sale of marijuana is
no longer a felony under federal law, ganjapreneurs may use
the federally regulated banking and financial systems to
make deposits and credit card sales, as well as to raise
209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the
United States . . . .”).
210. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012);
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (“The Constitution empowers
Congress to ‘lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.’
Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Incident to this power, Congress may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power ‘to further broad
policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys . . . .’” (quoting Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.))).
211. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 579–85; New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 171–72 (1992); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08.
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capital for start-up companies or expansion of ones already
in business. The risk of robbery and burglary of individuals
and companies will drop off because they will be able to offer
credit card purchases. Companies can also take advantage of
the interstate transportation systems to expand their
markets beyond their states of origin. Some individuals who
are fearful of breaking the law as long as the CSA is in effect
might be willing to purchase cannabis. And as business
improves for all or some of those reasons, states might take
in greater tax receipts.
To be sure, that exchange is not identical to the ones that
the Supreme Court approved in cases like South Dakota v.
Dole, where Congress conditioned a percentage of federal
highway funds otherwise allocable to the states on their
adoption of 21 as the minimum drinking age. Here, the states
would not receive federal funds, and the states would not
have a guarantee of receiving additional tax revenues for
agreeing to follow Congress’s wishes. Nonetheless,
Congress’s decision to exempt a state from the CSA is a
legitimate type of “consideration” for contract purposes, and
that should be sufficient here.212
Contract law has traditionally required some form of
consideration for an agreement to bind the parties.213
Congress’s revision of the CSA is ample in form and amount.
As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes clear,
“Consideration may consist of performance or of a return
promise,” “performance may be a specified act of forbearance

212. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 577–77 (“We have
repeatedly characterized . . . Spending Clause legislation as much in the nature
of a contract.”) (emphasis and internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Barnes v.
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002))); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (“(1) Except
as stated in Subsection (2), the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which
there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.
(2) Whether or not there is a bargain a contract may be formed under special
rules applicable to formal contracts or under the rules stated in §§ 82-94.”).
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. . . or such conduct as will produce a specified result,”214 and
(with certain exceptions) “any performance which is
bargained for is consideration.”215 Like all voluntary
exchanges, the offer described above leaves each party free
to decide whether it is better off by accepting the deal or
standing pat. Because Congress is under no obligation to
modify the CSA to allow medical or recreational marijuana
programs to exist, its decision to exempt a state from the CSA
is a legitimate benefit, not “a pretense of [a] bargain.”216 A
state is free to decline the offer because Congress would not
be making it an offer it can’t refuse.217 Moreover, state
residents who work in the cannabis industry or who consume
its products benefit, and their benefit redounds to the state
where they reside, pay taxes, or contribute to the local
economy. It is, as they say, a “fair deal.” The Tenth
Amendment requires no more than that.218
In fact, the “pioneering case” establishing the
Anticommandeering Doctrine,219 New York v. United States,
approved Congress’s use of nonfinancial incentives to obtain
state cooperation. To ensure the proper disposal of the
accumulating amount of radioactive waste generated within

214. Id. § 71 cmt. d.
215. Id. § 72; see id. § 75 (“Except as stated in §§ 76 and 77, a promise which is
bargained for is consideration if, but only if, the promised performance would be
consideration.”).
216. Id. § 73.
217. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 581 (“In this case, the financial
‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild
encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”).
218. See id. at 578 (“‘[W]here the Federal Government directs the States to
regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval,
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.’ Spending Clause
programs do not pose this danger when a State has a legitimate choice whether
to accept the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds. In such a situation,
state officials can fairly be held politically accountable for choosing to accept or
refuse the federal offer.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992))).
219. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018).
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the states, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. The act represented
a “compromise” between the three states with operating
radioactive waste disposal facilities (Nevada, South
Carolina, and Washington) and the 47 others. At the center
of the “intricate” mechanics of the law was the hope that
states would enter into regional compacts to ensure the safe
disposal of waste generated within their borders.220 To nudge
the states toward that goal, the act created three
“incentives.”221 The first incentive was financial. On a certain
date, the three states with operating disposal facilities could
impose surcharges on radioactive waste arriving from any
state not a party to a local waste disposal compact.222 The
second incentive was non-financial. States that failed to meet
a deadline to join a regional disposal compact, or to establish
its intent to develop an in-state disposal facility, could be
denied access to out-of-state disposal facilities.223 The final
incentive was that in name only. It provided that a state
must “take possession” of any waste that a state could not
adequately dispose of by a date fixed by the act.224
The Supreme Court held that the first two incentives
were constitutional.225 The financial incentive was a
straightforward exercise of Congress’s regulatory authority
under the Commerce and Spending Clauses. Congress could
itself impose the surcharges, Congress can allow individual
220. New York, 505 U.S. at 152–54
221. Id. at 152.
222. Id. at 152–53, 171 (“The first set of incentives works in three steps. First,
Congress has authorized States with disposal sites to impose a surcharge on
radioactive waste received from other States. Second, the Secretary of Energy
collects a portion of this surcharge and places the money in an escrow account.
Third, States achieving a series of milestones receive portions of this fund.”).
223. Id. at 153, 173 (“In the second set of incentives, Congress has authorized
States and regional compacts with disposal sites gradually to increase the cost of
access to the sites, and then to deny access altogether, to radioactive waste
generated in States that do not meet federal deadlines.”).
224. Id. at 153–54.
225. Id. at 171–86.
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states to burden interstate commerce by imposing a
surcharge on waste generated in another state, and Congress
can require states to achieve certain milestones to avoid
paying those surcharges.226 Like the first incentive, the
second one was also lawful. Here, too, Congress can permit a
state to discriminate against interstate commerce by
refusing to dispose of waste generated elsewhere.227
Moreover, the consequence for a state of failing to achieve
Congress’s designated milestone fell on the party who
generated the waste, not the receiving state.228 Only the
third “incentive”—the so-called “take title” requirement—
was unconstitutional.229 As the Court saw it, a requirement
that a state take possession of hazardous waste generated
within its borders “crossed the line distinguishing
encouragement from coercion.”230
The ownership and no-advertising requirements should
be permissible under New York v. United States. Unlike the
third “choice” given to the states in that case, Congress
clearly has the power to demand that states accept the status
quo in which federal law prohibits any and all marijuana
226. Id. at 171–73.
227. Id. at 173–74.
228. Id. at 174 (“This is the choice presented to nonsited States by the Act’s
second set of incentives: States may either regulate the disposal of radioactive
waste according to federal standards by attaining local or regional selfsufficiency, or their residents who produce radioactive waste will be subject to
federal regulation authorizing sited States and regions to deny access to their
disposal sites. The affected States are not compelled by Congress to regulate,
because any burden caused by a State’s refusal to regulate will fall on those who
generate waste and find no outlet for its disposal, rather than on the State as a
sovereign. A State whose citizens do not wish it to attain the Act’s milestones
may devote its attention and its resources to issues its citizens deem more
worthy; the choice remains at all times with the residents of the State, not with
Congress. The State need not expend any funds, or participate in any federal
program, if local residents do not view such expenditures or participation as
worthwhile. Nor must the State abandon the field if it does not accede to federal
direction; the State may continue to regulate the generation and disposal of
radioactive waste in any manner its citizens see fit.” (citation omitted)).
229. Id. at 174–77.
230. Id. at 175.
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distribution.231 Lifting the ban in states that agree to the
ownership and advertising conditions is a permissible option
because Congress can sacrifice uniformity in the application
of federal law if it has a legitimate reason for doing so.232
Reducing the risk of marijuana dependency and lowering
roadway mortality unquestionably are legitimate goals. The
conditions also rationally strive toward their achievement.
Congress could believe that state officials will have a greater
incentive than private retailers to ensure that minors do not
purchase cannabis, and the advertising ban imposes a
limited restraint233 that does not threaten free speech
231. Id. at 175–76 (“The take title provision offers state governments a ‘choice’
of either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the instructions
of Congress. Respondents do not claim that the Constitution would authorize
Congress to impose either option as a freestanding requirement. On one hand,
the Constitution would not permit Congress simply to transfer radioactive waste
from generators to state governments. Such a forced transfer, standing alone,
would in principle be no different than a congressionally compelled subsidy from
state governments to radioactive waste producers. The same is true of the
provision requiring the States to become liable for the generators’ damages.
Standing alone, this provision would be indistinguishable from an Act of
Congress directing the States to assume the liabilities of certain state residents.
Either type of federal action would ‘commandeer’ state governments into the
service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent
with the Constitution’s division of authority between federal and state
governments. On the other hand, the second alternative held out to state
governments—regulating pursuant to Congress’ direction—would, standing
alone, present a simple command to state governments to implement legislation
enacted by Congress. As we have seen, the Constitution does not empower
Congress to subject state governments to this type of instruction.”).
232. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (holding
Congress can prohibit broadcast lottery advertising in states that forbid lotteries
and allow advertising in states where lotteries are lawful); New York, 505 U.S. at
171–73 (holding Congress can allow states to impose a surcharge on hazardous
waste generated out of state, or refuse to accept it altogether, as part of a plan to
encourage each state to develop waste storage facilities); Northeast Bancorp, Inc.
v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174–78 (1985) (holding Congress can condition
interstate bank acquisitions); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 422–
27 (1946) (holding Congress may authorize a state to pass legislation that would
otherwise violate the Dormant Commerce Clause).
233. Several apps—such as Leafly, MassRoots, Weedmaps, and Eaze—enable
prospective consumers to find potential sellers. See SUMMERS, supra note 11, at
112–15. Whether a state or Congress could prohibit private parties from
advertising the availability, price, and quality of cannabis is beyond the scope of
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interests because states do not have First Amendment
rights.234 In addition, here as in New York v. United States,
the harm from the state’s rejection of the conditions falls on
the cannabis industry, not the state, because companies miss
out on the financial and commercial benefits from a truly
legal business, not just a quasi-legal one.235
To be sure, there are strings attached to the choice
Congress would encourage the states to pick. Congress also
might not be able to put the states to accept conditions like
these two in other circumstances, such as where Congress
has not outlawed the product in question and could not do so.
But Congress can and has outlawed cannabis distribution
under the CSA for 50 years, so the choice offered to the states
hardly presents them with an unforeseeable decision. Unlike
the “choice” put to the states in New York v. United States,
Congress is still giving the states an honest alternative.236
That should be sufficient to defeat any Tenth Amendment
challenge.
CONCLUSION
Like alcohol and tobacco, marijuana is a consumer good
that can harm individual users and third parties. Most states
with medical or recreational cannabis programs permit
private businesses to own the means of production and sale,
and the states regulate those operations. But traditional
this Article.
234. See supra note 177.
235. See New York, 505 U.S. at 174.
236. See id. at 176–77 (“Respondents emphasize the latitude given to the
States to implement Congress’ plan. The Act enables the States to regulate
pursuant to Congress’ instructions in any number of different ways. States may
avoid taking title by contracting with sited regional compacts, by building a
disposal site alone or as part of a compact, or by permitting private parties to
build a disposal site. States that host sites may employ a wide range of designs
and disposal methods, subject only to broad federal regulatory limits. This line of
reasoning, however, only underscores the critical alternative a State lacks: A
State may not decline to administer the federal program. No matter which path
the State chooses, it must follow the direction of Congress.”).
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regulatory tools such as licensing, product quality testing,
and taxation do not address the harms caused to users by
cannabis dependency and to third parties by marijuanaimpaired drivers. Additional supply-side approaches are also
necessary. States should assume responsibility for the retail
sale of cannabis, just as many already do in the case of
alcohol. States should also decline to advertise their own
cannabis sales. Finally, as an exercise in cooperative
federalism, Congress should offer to lift the federal ban on
marijuana sales if states assume those responsibilities. Some
states do that now in the case of alcohol. The states and
Congress should use the same approach for cannabis.

